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ABSTRACT 
 
Three Essays on the Effect of Information on Product Valuation.  (December 2006) 
Robert George Brummett, B.S., University of Missouri – Columbia 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 Benefits and consequences of controversial products are debated in the public 
arena for the protection of consumers and to evaluate the market decisions made by 
industry and government. The food industry continues to develop new foods as well as 
processes to bring food to the market. Some of these processes bring to issue the safety 
of the products or the impact on the market, workers, or environment. Such controversial 
products or processes include BSE (mad cow disease), genetically modified organisms 
(GMO), antibiotics, pesticides, carbon monoxide modified atmosphere packaging, and 
food irradiation. 
 This thesis sets out with the objective of understanding, developing, and utilizing 
methodologies similar to those used in other contingent valuation studies to evaluate 
how consumers are influenced by varying information using food irradiation as a focus 
subject. Food irradiation is a technological food process that continues to be debated and 
much information favoring and opposing it is readily available to the public, making it a 
suitable subject about which to study information effects and consumer acceptance. 
To accomplish this objective, consumers were surveyed in grocery stores in the 
state of Texas during the spring of 2006. As irradiated foods are not currently widely 
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available, a hypothetical product, irradiated mangoes, was used to elicit information 
from survey participants. The survey was comprised of two parts.  First general 
information regarding consumer knowledge and trust of food irradiation as well as 
willingness to pay (WTP) was collected. Second, varying information regarding food 
irradiation (positive, negative, or mixed) was presented and questioning was 
reaccomplished. 
 Evaluation of the survey data was made in three papers, each comprising its own 
chapter in this thesis. The first paper evaluates consumers’ initial trust and knowledge of 
food irradiation and how these factors interact with information in changing WTP. The 
second paper assesses responses for a “cheap talk” effect. Cheap talk is informing 
consumers of the existence of hypothetical bias in studies of this type with the goal being 
to reduce this bias to real life response equivalence. The third paper evaluates not only 
WTP, but also how consumer trust is affected by varying forms of information.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
New products are continually being introduced to the market which may involve 
processes or origins important to consumers. The objective of this thesis is to evaluate 
the impact of differing information types (positive, negative, or mixed) on consumer 
attitudes toward, and perceptions of products where market data is not readily available, 
using an irradiated food as a target product.   
Food irradiation continues to be a controversial topic, and using it as a target 
product elicits varying degrees of acceptance and product perceptions that are broad 
enough in scope to evaluate acceptance of the product and the effects of information on 
that acceptance from a variety of consumers with differing attitudes and perceptions.  
Willingness to pay (WTP) is evaluated by comparing pre-information presentation WTP 
to post-information presentation WTP. Additionally, consumer perceptions, knowledge, 
and trust regarding food irradiation are evaluated by incorporating these variables into 
the WTP analysis.   
This thesis is comprised of three different, yet related papers evaluating intrinsic 
variables held by consumers and employed in the literature. Each paper comprises its 
own chapter, with a summary and conclusion for the thesis to follow in the final chapter.  
The first two papers are methodological in nature and provide insight about the 
interaction of trust, knowledge, and information, including cheap talk. The objective of 
                                                 
  This thesis follows the style and format of the Journal of Consumer Research. 
  2 
 the third paper is to provide a more robust analysis of information on consumer WTP 
and acceptance of irradiated foods by building on the findings of the first two.   
The first paper evaluates how consumers’ prior trust and knowledge interact 
with, and are affected by, varying types of food irradiation information (positive, 
negative, and mixed). This study investigates the effect of information on consumers’ 
product valuation as measured by willingness to pay. Additionally, this study is designed 
to identify if an order effect in information presentation exists when both types of 
information are presented together, but in differing order. Results are observed that 
measure the information effects and provide insight useful to industry, academia, and 
regulatory agencies on the influence of information on consumer attitudes and 
perceptions. Consumers’ WTP for an irradiated fruit before and after information 
regarding food irradiation is presented. The participants were randomly assigned into 
one of three treatment groups: positive information, negative information and mixed 
information. When mixed information is presented, the order effect (positive-then-
negative vs. negative-then-positive) is also examined. Results of consumer prior 
knowledge and trust regarding food irradiation generally suggest that positive 
information has little effect on the WTP, and negative information, whether presented 
alone or with positive information, significantly decreases the WTP. Order effects are 
not detected. Consumers’ prior knowledge and trust of the product are not observed to 
mitigate the information effects on WTP. The WTP of subjects lacking prior knowledge, 
compared to those with prior knowledge, are more heavily influenced by information 
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presented. The average WTP of subjects decreased after presentation of negative 
information and is lower for those without trust than those with trust of the product. 
The second paper evaluates the effects of information referred to as “cheap-talk”.  
Essentially, since a hypothetical product (irradiated mangoes) is being presented as an 
option to consumers in eliciting WTP, study participants were informed that previous 
studies asking WTP on a hypothetical product show that respondents tend to 
overestimate their choice. This provided information to help address questions regarding 
error in using a hypothetical situation as well as provide another information attribute to 
be evaluated in consumer studies of this type. Results generally suggest that willingness 
to pay values, with and without cheap talk, are not statistically different in the majority 
of the sample. Some cheap talk effects were observed however, among those who trust 
the product in one of the treatments. Cheap talk was found to have a mitigating effect on 
the influence of the treatment and control variables on willingness to pay.   
The third paper builds on the previous two and information effects on WTP are 
also evaluated with respect the level of trust in food irradiation. Results generally 
suggest that positive information increases WTP but more so for those without initial 
trust of food irradiation while negative information, whether presented with positive 
information or alone, reduces WTP but only for those with initial trust. The results also 
suggest that those with initial trust in food irradiation generally have higher WTP pre- 
and post-information than those who do not have initial trust. Positive information 
increases trust while negative information, again whether presented with positive 
information or alone, decreases trust. Hence, negative information dominates positive 
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information and decreases both trust and WTP. The fifth chapter summarizes the results 
of this thesis, and offers suggestions for future research. 
The design of the surveys in our study incorporated both positive and negative 
information from varying sources. The information presented to participants was 
excerpted from government and consumer advocacy organizations websites. We 
balanced the information on a point and counter point basis, without modifying the 
content excerpted from the sources. Our results generally indicate that the negative 
information outweigh the positive even with this balancing, which is consistent with 
Hayes, Fox, and Shogren (2002).   
We conducted our surveys in four different Texas cities (Houston, Austin, San 
Antonio, and Waco). With the help of the grocery retailer allowing us to conduct surveys 
in their stores, we selected stores with customers from varying demographic 
backgrounds. 
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CHAPTER II   
INFORMATION EFFECTS ON PRODUCT VALUATION: DO PRIOR 
KNOWLEDGE AND TRUST MATTER? 
 
Introduction 
In this study, we investigate the effect of information on consumers’ willingness 
to pay for a product. The existing studies have shown that positive and negative 
information about a product can have differential effects on product acceptance.  
Positive information, when presented alone, has been demonstrated to increase product 
acceptance (Hayes et al 2002; Nayga, Aiew, and Nichols 2005). On the other hand, the 
literature, especially the impression formation literature, found that negative information 
effects far outweigh positive information effects (e.g., Klein 1996; Kroloff 1988; 
Skowronski and Carlston 1989; Wright 1974). For example, it has been shown that 
negative attributes generally have a stronger influence on consumers’ judgments on 
product quality than positive attributes (Fiske 1980). Similarly, negative personality 
traits have been shown to have a greater influence on interpersonal judgments 
(Skowronski and Carlston 1987) and negative word of mouth has been shown to have a 
stronger impact than positive word of mouth (Herr, Kardes, and Kim 1991). Negative 
information, whether presented alone or in combination with positive information has 
also been shown to decrease product acceptance (Hayes, Fox, and Shogren 2002). 
Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990) noted that one reason for the negativity 
effect is that negative information is considered more diagnostic or informative than 
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positive information. Prospect theory also posits that people tend to become more risk 
seeking in the domain of losses than gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Although it is 
suggested that consumers respond to negative information in a homogenous manner 
(Marconi 1997; Pearson and Mitroff 1993), Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava (2000) 
argued, however, that prior characteristics of the consumer could moderate the 
processing and impact of negative information. Specifically, they evaluated the specific 
effect of commitment to a target brand and tested the differential responses to negative 
information of consumers who are high and low in commitment. They found that 
commitment is a moderating factor of negative information effects.  
When faced with a choice, consumers also rely on a number of other factors, in 
addition to commitment to a brand, in the decision making process. This holds true for a 
variety of goods and services and the factors at work behind these decisions are 
complex. External influences on the attitudes and perceptions held by consumers 
regarding a particular product weigh in on the choices made by consumers. Two of these 
key variables that influence attitudes and perceptions toward a product are prior 
knowledge and initial trust of the product. We contend that these two factors form initial 
beliefs that could mitigate or distort new information and subsequently influence how 
information is processed in the valuation of a product. For example, it is well known that 
people tend to perceive new information as compatible with their prior beliefs (Hoch and 
Ha 1986). The mechanism for these initial beliefs is similar to that associated with a 
confirmatory bias or sticky prior beliefs (Bolton 2003; Jonas et al. 2001; Klayman 1995; 
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Schwenk 1986) and Biyalogorsky, Boulding, and Staelin (2006) refer to this path as 
“belief inertia distortion”.  
Consequently, in this study, we argue that effects of information, be it positive or 
negative, can differ depending upon consumers’ initial beliefs based on prior trust and 
knowledge of a product. We hypothesize that information effects on consumer response 
are influenced by the initial values of these two variables. Prior knowledge has been 
shown to reduce acceptance of a product by a greater factor than was discounted by 
those without prior knowledge, and consumers with no prior knowledge of the product 
attribute are more heavily influenced by the presentation of information than those that 
possess prior knowledge (Huffman et al. 2006). Hence, exploration of the influence of 
prior trust and knowledge has the potential to further the understanding of the effects of 
information on product acceptance or valuation. 
Our study differs from most other studies in several respects. First, we attempt to 
assess the individual and combined effects of positive and negative information on 
consumer valuation of a product. Second, since the order in which the consumer receives 
information may affect the impact of the message (Crowley and Hoyer 1994) and 
product valuation, we assess the possible existence of order effects in the presentation of 
information. Hass and Linder (1972) provided some evidence that negative information 
presented early in a message is more effective for persuasion than placing it last or not 
mentioning it at all. Third, we analyze the differential responses to information by 
consumers grouped based on their level of prior knowledge and trust of the product1. To 
                                                 
1 During the conduct of this study, irradiated mangoes were not sold yet in supermarkets.    
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the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate if and how information 
effects on product valuation varies by level of prior knowledge and initial trust of the 
product. Fourth, we use a field experiment with a diverse set of participants rather than 
using students in a laboratory study, which hopefully helps with the generalization of the 
findings. Fifth, we use as a case product a relatively novel product in irradiated mangoes. 
Due to the controversy surrounding food irradiation technology, the use of irradiated 
mangoes provides an excellent opportunity to test the role of initial beliefs, as formed 
through prior knowledge and trust of food irradiation, on information effects and product 
valuation. It has been shown that a novel attribute can affect product evaluation 
(Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001). Sixth, instead of a simpler new product evaluation 
measure based on product acceptance, we use an economic and quantitative measure in 
willingness to pay (WTP). To cope with an increasingly demand-driven marketplace, 
many businesses are interested in “adding value” to their products by differentiating or 
developing alternative products or services with new technologies. Hence, estimates of 
the value of novel products are becoming important instruments guiding decision-
making. However, research and development and new product introductions can be 
costly, especially in very competitive markets with low success rates (e.g., food 
industry). Thus, research on consumers’ WTP for these novel goods or services is 
critical to product introduction or adoption decisions.  
Our results suggest that positive information has little effect on the WTP, and 
negative information, whether presented alone or with positive information, significantly 
decreases the WTP. However, WTP of those given positive information is higher than 
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WTP of those given negative information or those given both positive and negative 
information. Order effects are not evident. Prior trust and knowledge are generally 
shown not to mitigate the effects of information on product valuation. The rest of the 
paper is structured as follows: the next section lays out the study design. The third 
section discusses the survey results and presents hypothesis tests regarding information 
effects. Concluding remarks are given in the last section. 
 
Study Design 
In this section, we discuss the design and implementation of our field 
experiment. We then use a novel method to calculate the WTP of the participants, which 
is not restricted by the implicit bounds imposed by the elicitation mechanism we used 
(i.e., payment card). 
 
Theoretical Motivation 
Theoretical frameworks have been postulated that help explain the mechanisms 
at work in information effects. Crowley and Hoyer (1994) evaluated previous theories in 
their study on two-sided persuasion, which consists of a message that provides 
information about both positive and negative attributes of a product. One of the theories 
they discussed is Inoculation Theory where the form of the message being presented is 
strengthened by identifying weakness in the product then refuting these identified 
weaknesses in the same material presentation (McGuire 1961). They also identified 
Attribution Theory (Kelley 1973) as the process where cause is assigned to events. 
  10 
Under this theory, the inclusion of negative information along with positive information 
is made, but not refuted. The inclusion of negative information is expected to increase 
acceptance of the product because the consumer may infer trust in the message if the 
advertiser is willing to present both the positive and negative attributes. Optimal Arousal 
Theory (Berlyne 1971), on the other hand, argues that a novelty factor increases 
acceptance of a product. However, the magnitude of the novelty may have adverse 
consequences in that too much of it could lead to a negative effect (i.e., reduced 
acceptance). Essentially, this theory suggests that negative information may be useful or 
detrimental in generating favorable attitudes toward a product, depending on its use, 
context, and volume.  
When prior knowledge is not held, however, the presentation of conflicting 
information may lead to decreased acceptance. This can be attributed to people’s 
inability to reconcile the inconsistent information when lacking prior knowledge or 
information (Sengupta and Johar 2002). It has also been suggested that prior positive 
values held by consumers may mediate the effects of negative information (Ahluwalia, 
Burnkrant, and Onnava 2000). However, large amounts of negative information, when 
presented with positive information, may outweigh the positive information and result in 
a net negative effect (Crowley and Hoyer 1994). 
Building on these theories and previous studies, this paper aims to further the 
understanding of information effects through a carefully designed and implemented field 
experiment. In our experiments and subsequent analysis, we not only consider positive, 
negative and mixed information, but also the possible mitigating effects of initial trust 
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and prior knowledge. In addition, we investigate the order effect in the presentation of 
both types of information since the order in which the consumers receive and process 
information may affect the impact of the message (Crowley and Hoyer 1994). 
 
Field Experiment 
We use an arte-factual field experiment (see Harrison and List 2004) to assess the 
effect of positive and negative information on product valuation and to examine the 
influence of prior knowledge and trust on information effects. Specifically, we recruited 
participants in the field (i.e., grocery stores). Grocery shoppers in different cities in 
Texas were asked during spring 2006 to participate in surveys regarding their 
willingness to pay for irradiated mangoes. Participants were provided a brief information 
sheet about mangoes and were informed that prior to entering the country, mangoes must 
be treated to eliminate insects, which may be harmful to domestic crops if imported. 
They were informed that we were evaluating their perceptions of, and attitudes toward 
food irradiation, an alternative to conventional processes to eliminate insects. They were 
informed that food irradiation kills or sterilizes insects and utilizes energy versus more 
conventional insect control processes.  
Participants were then asked a series of questions to identify their shopping 
habits as well as knowledge and perceptions of food irradiation prior to the presentation 
of information regarding food irradiation. Additionally, prior to information 
presentation, participants were informed of the average price for mangoes in the past 
year ($0.50 each) and were then asked their WTP for an irradiated mango. WTP choices 
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were provided in the form of a payment card. In a payment card, participants are 
presented with a range of monetary amounts and are asked to identify the maximum 
amount they would be willing to pay. The categorical values used in the payment card 
were determined based on the pre-tests and were calculated using the method described 
in Rowe, Schulze, and Breffle (1996). The values ranged from $0.00 to $0.50 and 
included a response for “more than $0.50”. Marginal WTP (i.e., willingness to pay extra 
compared to non-irradiated mango) was utilized instead of a WTP unit price as this 
allows participants to better “picture” the extra expenditure on food if paying more for 
the irradiated product (De Ridder and De Graeve 2005). 
More specific information was then presented to the participants. Participants 
were randomly assigned to different treatments (see Figure 2.1). Treatments were 
differentiated by type of information to be presented. In the first treatment, participants 
were provided positive information stating the benefits of food irradiation. In the second 
treatment, participants were provided negative information regarding negative 
consequences of food irradiation. In the third treatment, participants were provided both 
forms of information, though the order of the information was alternated between 
positive-then-negative and negative-then-positive. After the presentation of the 
information, participants were again asked about their attitudes and perceptions toward 
food irradiation, including WTP utilizing the payment card method described above. The 
positive and negative information used in the study are exhibited in Appendix A and B. 
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Figure 2.1 
 
Experiment Structure and Analysis 
 
 
Payment Card Calculation 
Based on the pre-tests, we offered choices within the range of 0-50 cents. 
Therefore, participants with marginal WTP equal to or less than zero are reported to 
have a zero (lowest category) WTP. On the other hand, people with WTP greater than 50 
cents (highest category) are reported with a non-numerical value (“greater than 50 
cents”). If we simply use zero and 50 cents as their WTP for these lowest and highest 
categories, our statistical analysis may suffer from measurement errors. 
Instead, we use an alternative method. Under the assumption that the underlying 
WTP distribution is sufficiently smooth, we estimate the entire WTP distribution based 
on the discrete information obtained from our payment card report. Wu and Perloff 
(forthcoming) propose a density estimator from grouped data using the maximum 
entropy density method. By matching the population and sample moments for each WTP 
Pre-
Information 
Questioning 
Information Presentation 
By Treatment 
1) Positive 
Only 
2) Negative 
Only 
3) Positive and 
Negative 
(order toggled) 
Post-
Information 
Questioning 
Tests of Means between 
Treatments (Pre- and 
Post-Information) 
Tests of Means within 
Treatments (Pre- minus 
Post-Information) 
Test of Third 
Treatment for Order 
Effects 
Regression Analysis 
  14 
interval, this estimator is able to obtain an accurate approximation of the underlying 
distribution. The density function has a flexible functional form 
)exp()(
0∑ =−= Ki ii xxf λ . 
It is known that this maximum entropy density nests many commonly used 
distributions. With K = 2, it coincides with the normal distribution. When K = 4, this 
density is able to accommodate skew and/or fat-tailed distribution, or even multi-modal 
distribution. Moreover, the support of the unknown distribution is allowed to be the real 
line. This extra degree of freedom is particularly useful for our purpose, as we are 
interested in the truncated mean of WTP for people reporting zero or greater than 50 
cents WTP. 
For our estimation, we set K = 4, and estimate the underlying WTP distribution 
for each treatment scenario before and after treatment. With the estimated density, we 
evaluate the truncated average WTP for people reporting zero and greater than 50 cents 
WTP. The minimum and maximum WTP values are reported in Table 2.1. Note that 
although we allow the support of the density to be the real line, the estimates suggest that 
the underlying distribution is likely to range from -$0.10 to $0.65. 
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Analysis of Experiment Results 
Information Effect Hypotheses 
The design of our experiment allows us to investigate the possibly differential 
effects of positive, negative and mixed information. We developed a list of hypotheses 
based on prior studies and the objective of our study:   
H1: Positive information presented alone increases the WTP. 
H2: Negative information presented alone decreases the WTP. 
H3: When both forms of information are presented, the negative information 
dominates, and the net effect decreases the WTP. 
H4: When both forms of information are presented, there is an order effect such 
that the order of presentation (positive-then-negative vs. negative-then-
positive) influences the net effect of information. 
H5: Information effects on the WTP depend on the initial levels of knowledge 
and trust of the product. 
In all, 155 participants completed surveys used in the experiments. The 
breakdown of participants by treatment and summary statistics of the WTP are presented 
in Table 2.1. Table 2.2 reports the t-tests on the difference in the average pre-information 
WTP between different treatment groups. The results suggest that there is no systematic 
difference in the average WTP for participants in different treatment group, which is 
consistent with the randomness of treatment assignment of our experiment.  
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Table 2.1   
 
Summary of Willingness to Pay Means by Treatment 
Treatment n 
Pre/Post 
Information Mean SD 
Difference in 
Means 
(Post – Pre) 
Within 
Treatment Test 
of Means 
 p-value 
Pre .1448 .2201 Positive only 49 
Post .1638 .2066 
.0190 .143 
Pre .1268 .2393 Negative only 55 
Post .0182 .1806 
-.1086 .000** 
Pre .0805 .2099 Positive and 
Negative 51 Post .0260 .1769 
-.0545 .041** 
Below is the third treatment split by order of information presentation. 
Pre .0761 .2212 Positive then 
Negative 24 Post .0060 .1419 -.0702 .067* 
Pre .0844 .2036 Negative then 
Positive 27 Post .0439 .2042 
-.0406 .288 
*significant at the .10 level 
**significant at the .05 level 
 
Table 2.2 
 
Tests of Willingness to Pay Means between Treatments 
 Pre-Information Post-Information 
Treatment n Difference p-value Difference p-value 
Positive only –  
Negative only 49 / 55 .0180 .691 .1456** .000 
Positive only –  
Positive and Negative 49 / 51 .0643 .139 .1378** .001 
Negative only –  
Positive and Negative 55 / 51 .0462 .291 -.0078 .822 
Below is the third treatment split by order of information presentation. 
Positive only –  
Positive then Negative 49 / 24 .0687 .219 .1578** .000 
Positive only –  
Negative then Positive 49 / 27 .0604 .235 .1199** .018 
Negative only –  
Positive then Negative 55 / 24 .0507 .366 .0122 .748 
Negative only –  
Negative then Positive 55 / 27 .0424 .407 -.0257 .582 
Positive then Negative –  
Negative then Positive 24 / 27 -.0083 .890 .0379 .442 
**significant at the .05 level 
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It is hypothesized that the presentation of positive information would result in an 
increased WTP, indicating an increased value in the irradiated mangoes being perceived 
by participants and a greater acceptance of irradiated foods. In treatment one where only 
positive information is presented, the pre-information mean WTP was $0.1448, and the 
post-information mean was $0.1638 (Table 2.1). The t-tests of difference in means 
indicate that the increase was not statistically significant (p = .143). Although this test 
does not support a definitive effect between the presentation of positive information and 
increased WTP, neither does it show an adverse or unexpected result (i.e., a significant 
decrease). Further analysis of this treatment will be subsequently explained that may 
shed more light on this subject. 
A second hypothesis is that the presentation of negative information will 
decrease the mean WTP. The pre-information WTP for this treatment was $0.1268 
versus $0.0182 post-information (Table 2.1). The t-tests indicate a highly significant 
information effect (p = .000), lending strong support to the hypothesis that negative 
information decreases the WTP. 
Hypothesis three postulates that negative information dominates positive 
information and the net effect decreases WTP in the third treatment where mixed 
information is presented.  Pre- and post-information mean WTP was $0.0805 and 
$0.0260, respectively (Table 2.1). The t-tests verify that the WTP decreased significantly 
following the presentation of mixed information (p = .041), indicating that the negative 
information, though presented with the positive information, does decrease WTP.   
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We divide the third treatment group into two subgroups according to whether the 
positive or negative information was presented first. The t-tests of the mean WTPs of 
these sub-treatments suggest that when positive information was presented first, the 
mean WTP indeed decreased (p = .067). The significance level of these results is 
marginally less than that seen in the previously described tests. Further, when negative 
information was presented first, no significant difference was observed (p = .288). These 
results suggest that there are no strong order effects.  
 
Effects of Prior Knowledge and Trust 
Overall, regarding the information effects, the results support our hypotheses 2 
and 3, but not 1 and 4. Further analyses into the variables that factor into the consumer 
decision making process, specifically prior knowledge and trust of irradiated foods, 
might help better understand and explain the role of these factors in explaining the 
interaction of the factors with varying types of information on consumer valuation of 
irradiated foods.   
Prior knowledge was identified in the survey by asking participants to rate their 
knowledge as: adequately informed about the irradiation, somewhat informed, heard of 
food irradiation but know nothing about it, and have not heard of food irradiation. For 
simplicity, we classify those individuals that were somewhat to adequately informed as 
knowledgeable, and those that stated they had not heard of, or knew nothing about food 
irradiation as not knowledgeable. 
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Initial trust in food irradiation was determined by posing the question, “Would 
you trust irradiated food products?” to participants prior to the presentation of 
information. The response was a dichotomous variable “Yes” or “No”.   
To further evaluate the mechanisms at work behind the effects of information on 
WTP and the underlying changes in attitude and perception, we utilized the same data 
set from the experiments in our overall analysis and incorporated the prior knowledge 
and initial trust of food irradiation held by participants. As discussed above, we did not 
observe the expected increase in WTP resulting from the presentation of positive 
information for participants in treatment 1 when we did not consider initial trust or 
knowledge. However, among participants with no prior food irradiation knowledge, we 
observe an increased WTP. Mean WTP increased from $0.1326 to $0.1635 (p = .044 
(Table 2.3)). A significant change in WTP among the participants with prior knowledge 
was not observed and the mean WTP remained essentially unchanged ($0.1699 pre- and 
$0.1644 post-information). Interestingly, the information effect expressed a greater 
ability to positively influence those lacking knowledge, while those possessing prior 
knowledge were not swayed. This is consistent with the findings of Huffman et al. 
(2006).  
Assessment of the trust factor shows that among those that expressed an initial 
non-trust of irradiated foods, the positive information was marginally effective in 
increasing WTP. Mean WTP went from -$0.0065 to $0.0205 (p = .065, Table 2.4). The 
WTP among those possessing an initial trust was unchanged. As expected, the WTP 
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among those with trust was much higher than those without trust ($0.2116 pre-, $0.2270 
post-information).  
Although we are able to see influences of the individual results of the trust and 
knowledge factors on WTP resulting from positive information, our analysis of the effect 
when these factors were coupled failed to identify any significant positive information 
effect (Table 2.5). In summary, we note that the information presented in this experiment 
(positive only) was only marginally effective in increasing WTP among those without 
trust and that increase remained at the lower end of the payment card choices as 
compared higher WTP responses among those with trust. Participants without prior 
knowledge, evaluated independent of trust, did appear to be positively influenced by the 
information. However, we could not maintain support of this hypothesis when these 
factors were combined. This is congruent with our analysis of the overall information 
effects, prior to evaluation of the trust and knowledge factors within the treatment.   
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Table 2.3 
 
Summary of Willingness to Pay Means by Treatment and Knowledge 
Treatment n 
Pre/Post 
Information Mean SD 
Within Treatment 
Test of Means  
p-value 
No Knowledge  
Pre .1326 .2013 33 Post .1635 .1870 Positive only 
Difference (Post – Pre) .0308  
.044** 
Pre .1514 .2667 41 Post .0262 .2030 Negative only 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.1252  
.001** 
Pre .1133 .2183 36 Post .0444 .1797 Positive and Negative 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0689  
.057* 
 Below is the third treatment split by order of information. 
Pre .1307 .2423 16 Post .0554 .1486 Positive then Negative 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0754  
.162 
Pre .0993 .2024 20 Post .0356 .2046 Negative then Positive 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0638  
.207 
Knowledgeable 
Pre .1699 .2603 16 Post .1644 .2489 Positive only 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0055  
.821 
Pre .0548 .1074 14 Post -.0054 .0893 Negative only 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0602  
.061* 
Pre .0019 .1700 15 Post -.0180 .1678 Positive and Negative 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0199  
.488 
 Below is the third treatment split by order of information. 
Pre -.0331 .1206 8 Post -.0929 .0456 Positive then Negative 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0598  
.205 
Pre .0419 .2168 7 Post .0676 .2174 Negative then Positive 
Difference (Post – Pre) .0256  
.408 
*significant at the .10 level  
**significant at the .05 level 
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Table 2.4 
 
Summary of Willingness to Pay Means by Treatment and Trust 
Treatment n 
Pre/Post 
Information Mean SD 
Within Treatment 
Test of Means 
p-value 
No Trust 
Pre -.0065 .0964 15 Post .0205 .0947 Positive only 
Difference (Post – Pre) .0270  
.065* 
Pre .0919 .2566 18 Post -.0067 .1937 Negative only 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0986  
.045** 
Pre .0188 .1907 22 Post -.0130 .1672 Positive and Negative Difference (Post – Pre) -.0318  
.476 
Below is the third treatment split by order of information presentation. 
Pre -.0313 .1307 10 Post -.0363 .1202 Positive then Negative Difference (Post – Pre) -.0050  
.833 
Pre .0605 .2265 12 Post .0650 .2016 Negative then Positive Difference (Post – Pre) .0045  
.507 
Trust 
Pre .2116 .2271 34 Post .2270 .2117 Positive only 
Difference (Post – Pre) .0154  
.384 
Pre .1438 .2322 37 Post .0274 .1759 Negative only 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.1164  
.002** 
Pre .1274 .2148 29 Post .0556 .1812 Positive and Negative Difference (Post – Pre) -.0715  
.032** 
Below is the third treatment split by order of information presentation. 
Pre .1529 .2440 14 Post .0361 .1525 Positive then Negative Difference (Post – Pre) -.1167  
.066* 
Pre .1036 .1892 15 Post .0737 .2083 Negative then Positive 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0298  
.294 
*significant at the .10 level 
**significant at the .05 level 
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Table 2.5 
 
Summary of Willingness to Pay Means by Treatment, Trust, and Knowledge 
Treatment n Pre/Post Information Mean SD 
Within Treatment Test of 
Means p-value 
No Trust, No Knowledge 
Pre .0037 .1089 10 
Post .0324 .1053 Positive only 
Difference (Post – Pre) .0287  
.146 
Pre .0983 .2662 16 
Post -.0082 .1984 Negative only 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.1065  
.039** 
Pre .0691 .2145 15 
Post .0319 .1875 Positive and Negative 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0372  
.574 
Below is the third treatment split by order of information presentation. 
Pre .0073 .1621 6 
Post .0122 .1377 Positive then Negative 
Difference (Post – Pre) .0049  
.906 
Pre .1104 .2436 9 
Post .0450 .2218 Negative then Positive 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0654  
.556 
No Trust, Knowledgeable 
Pre -.0271 .0711 5 
Post -.0032 .0735 Positive only 
Difference (Post – Pre) .0239  
.323 
Pre .0412 .2246 2 
Post .0596 .1986 Negative only 
Difference (Post – Pre) .0184  
.500 
Pre -.0891 .0000 7 
Post -.1090 .0000 Positive and Negative 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0199  
- 
Below is the third treatment split by order of information presentation 
Pre -.0891 .0000 4 
Post -.1090 .0000 Positive then Negative 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0199  
- 
Pre -.0891 .0000 3 
Post -.1090 .0000 Negative then Positive 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0199  
- 
**significant at the .05 level 
- blanks indicate insufficient data to test means 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
Treatment n 
Pre/Post 
Information Mean SD 
Within Treatment Test 
of Means p-value 
Trust, No Knowledge 
Pre .1886 .2080 23 
Post .2205 .1873 Positive only 
Difference (Post – Pre) .0319  
.124 
Pre .1854 .2668 25 
Post .0483 .2068 Negative only 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.1371  
.011** 
Pre .1448 .2206 21 
Post .0533 .1780 Positive and Negative 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0915  
.029** 
Below is the third treatment split by order of information presentation 
Pre .2048 .2588 10 
Post .0813 .1558 Positive then Negative 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.1235  
.139 
Pre .0902 .1737 11 Post .0278 .2001 Negative then Positive 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0624  
.053* 
Trust, Knowledgeable 
Pre .2595 .2671 11 
Post .2406 .2652 Positive only 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0189  
.585 
Pre .0571 .0949 12 
Post -.0162 .0703 Negative only 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0733  
.047** 
Pre .0816 .2056 8 
Post .0616 .2020 Positive and Negative 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0200  
.724 
Below is the third treatment split by order of information presentation 
Pre .2295 .1599 4 
Post -.0768 .0645 Positive then Negative 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.3063  
.333 
Pre .1402 .2528 4 
Post .2000 .2000 Negative then Positive 
Difference (Post – Pre) .0598  
.273 
*significant at the .05 level 
**significant at the .05 level 
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When only negative information is presented, our results show that consumers 
with no prior knowledge significantly decreased their WTP for irradiated foods. Mean 
WTP decreased from $0.1514 to $0.0262 (p = .001, Table 2.3). Though marginally less 
significant (p = .061), the WTP decreased as well among consumers with prior 
knowledge. These results support our hypothesis that negative information will decrease 
product valuation. As observed in experiment one, individuals lacking prior knowledge 
of food irradiation were more heavily influenced by the information presented.   
With respect to trust, we see that the presentation of negative information does 
decrease the WTP.  Mean WTP decreased from $0.0919 to -$0.0067 among participants 
without trust and from $0.1438 to $0.0274 among those with prior trust (p = .045 pre- 
and p = .002 post-information, Table 2.4). We note that those with trust maintain a 
positive, though significantly reduced WTP, while those without trust essentially 
indicate they would not be willing to pay any additional amount after being presented 
negative information. This indicates that prior trust may be a mitigating factor in the 
effect of negative information on WTP. 
Evaluation of the coupling of these factors and the presentation of negative 
information further supports our hypothesis of WTP reduction resulting from the 
presentation of negative information. Reduction in WTP regardless of prior trust and 
knowledge is seen in the test results of WTP means (Table 2.5). We note, however, that 
this analysis, where consumers did not have trust but did have prior knowledge, 
consisted of only two participants (Table 2.5). This sub-group within the treatment is too 
small to provide a reliable assessment. However, looking back at the results with respect 
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to the prior trust and knowledge factors, we see that negative information would indeed 
decrease the WTP, especially considering the significant reduction observed among 
those lacking trust.   
The third treatment involved presenting both forms of information utilized in 
experiments 1 and 2. The order of the information was changed between presenting the 
positive information first and the negative information first.   
When the order effect is not considered, participants with no knowledge were 
marginally influenced by the information while those that possessed prior knowledge did 
not change their WTP. The mean WTP among those without knowledge decreased from 
$0.1133 to $0.0444 (p = .057, Table 2.3), indicating that the negative information 
outweighed the positive. This further supports our hypothesis that negative information 
will outweigh the positive when both forms of information are presented. 
We next looked for an effect within the order of the information presentation. 
Under the condition of knowledge/no knowledge, we do not see a significant difference 
between the order of information presentation (Table 2.3). We ran tests of the WTP 
means between the ordered pre-information and no significant difference exists (no 
knowledge: p = .681; knowledgeable: p = .437). Similar results are obtained for post-
information WTP (no knowledge: p = .739; knowledgeable: p = .1004). The results 
suggest that there is no order effect when the participants have prior knowledge or no 
prior knowledge. 
We then evaluated this treatment with respect to trust and found that those with a 
prior trust of the food irradiation process decreased their WTP (p = .032, Table 2.4). In 
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evaluating this treatment under the condition of trust, we only see the possibility of small 
order effect. Marginally significant decreases in mean WTP are observed when negative 
information is presented subsequent to the positive when trust is present (p = .066). The 
mean decrease for the positive-then-negative sub-treatment was approximately 11 cents 
for those with trust (see Table 2.4). No change among either sub-treatment was observed 
when positive information was presented subsequent to the negative.  
In coupling the trust and knowledge factors in this treatment, we note that in 
three of the sub-treatments (positive and negative –no trust/ knowledgeable, positive-
then-negative – no trust/knowledgeable, and negative-then-positive – no 
trust/knowledgeable) the sample size was reduced to a point where tests of differences in 
means could not be performed (Table 2.5).  
Even with that, we obtain valid data that helps us explain the interaction of these 
factors within this treatment. Before considering the order of information presentation, 
we see that under the conditions of trust and no knowledge, a decrease in WTP is 
observed. The mean WTP response decreased to $0.0533 from $0.1448 (Table 2.5) 
when presented with both forms of information (p = .029). This demonstrates that 
negative information tends to decrease valuation of the product, across the sub-
treatments, most significantly when initial trust is present without prior knowledge.   
In assessing an order effect, what we had seen with respect to trust alone is no 
longer evident. It is interesting to point out that now that we have coupled the factors, 
under the condition of trust with no prior knowledge, we see a significant decrease in 
WTP in the negative-then-positive sub-treatment (p = .053, Table 2.5). The negative 
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information, though presented prior to the positive information had a great deal of 
influence on participants with trust and who also lacked prior knowledge. Results under 
the condition of trust alone and coupled trust/knowledge factors lead us to conclude that 
the order of information presentation may in fact be influential on information effects. 
However, due to what appears to be conflicting results, more study into this area is 
warranted. Consequently, we present the estimates from regression analysis below. 
 
Regression Analyses 
To complement the descriptive analyses presented above, we also conducted 
regression analysis using data from all three treatments, with the third treatment 
separated by order of information presentation to definitively assess information effects 
on product valuation and the possible mitigating effects of prior knowledge and trust. 
Demographic variables are also included as control variables (see Table 2.6). The 
dependent variable of interest is WTP, with WTP pre-information being of interest in the 
first model, and WTP post-information of interest in evaluating the post-information 
presentation effects. 
Our results indicate that WTP is significantly affected by trust but not prior 
knowledge in both pre-and post-information models. The post-information models also 
reveal the impact of the information provided during the surveys. Results suggest that 
the WTP of the second and third treatments or experiments (negative and positive-and-
negative information) are significantly lower than the WTP of first treatment, ceteris 
paribus.  Specifically, WTP of those given negative information and those given 
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positive-then-negative information is about 14 cents less than the WTP of those given 
positive information, across the post-information models exhibited in Table 2.6. The 
WTP of those given negative-then-positive information is about 10 to 11 cents lower 
than the WTP of those given positive information only. Hence, we find a slightly higher 
valuation from participants given negative-then-positive information than from 
participants given positive-then-negative information. However, this difference is not 
statistically significant. Therefore, consistent with our descriptive analysis, our 
regression results do not support the existence of order effects.  
As exhibited in Table 2.6, we estimated the post-information models with or 
without prior knowledge and trust variables to determine if they moderate the 
information effects. Note that the magnitude of the information or treatment effects do 
not significantly change with or without the prior knowledge and trust variables in the 
models. Hence, we cannot definitively say that prior knowledge and trust moderate or 
mitigate the information effects. 
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Table 2.6 
 
Willingness to Pay Regression Models 
Post-Information 
Pre-
Information 
Trust/ 
Knowledge 
Trust/No 
Knowledge 
No Trust/   
Knowledge 
No Trust/No 
Knowledge 
Variable1 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Knowledge .0079 (.0397) 
-.0099 
(.0355) - 
-.0080 
(.0366) - 
Negative 
information only  - 
-.1385** 
(.0363) 
-.1376** 
(.0360) 
-.1410** 
(.0375) 
-.1402** 
(.0372) 
Positive-then-
Negative 
information 
- -.1363** (.0460) 
-.1358** 
(.0458) 
-.1487** 
(.0473) 
-.1483** 
(.0471) 
Negative-then-
Positive 
information 
- -.0969** (.0446) 
-.0957** 
(.0442) 
-.1117** 
(.0458) 
-.1108** 
(.0454) 
Initial Trust .1392** (.0345) 
.1005** 
(.0309) 
.1004** 
(.0308) - - 
Participant Age -.0031** (.0012) 
-.0014 
(.0011) 
-.0015 
(.0010) 
-.0012 
(.0011) 
-.0013 
(.0011) 
Participant 
Gender  
(1 if female) 
.0922** 
(.0387) 
.0297 
(.0349) 
.0321 
(.0337) 
.0229 
(.0360) 
.0249 
(.0347) 
Participant 
Income  
(1 if > $50,000)  
.0372 
(.0335) 
-.0246 
(.0301) 
-.0244 
(.0300) 
-.0262 
(.0310) 
-.0260 
(.0309 
Hispanic Race .1060** (.0411) 
.0344 
(.0369) 
.0361 
(.0363) 
.0321 
(.0381) 
.0335 
(.0375) 
Other Races .0329 (.0458) 
-.0477 
(.0408) 
-.0467 
(.0405) 
-.0535 
(.0421) 
-.0527 
(.0417) 
Constant .0484 (.0741) 
.1450** 
(.0715) 
.1425** 
(.0707) 
.2138** 
(.0705) 
.2117** 
(.0696) 
R2 .2034 .2126 .2121 .1548 .1545 
1 base variables: Positive information only and White race  
**significant at the .05 level 
-blanks represent variable(s) not applicable to the model 
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Summary and Conclusion 
This study investigates the effect of information on consumers’ product valuation 
as measured by willingness to pay (WTP). We survey people’s WTP for an irradiated 
fruit before and after information regarding food irradiation is presented. The 
participants were randomly assigned into one of three treatment groups: positive 
information, negative information and mixed information. When mixed information is 
presented, the order effect (positive-then-negative vs. negative-then-positive) is also 
examined.  In addition, we also explore the effects of prior knowledge and trust on the 
WTP and how these factors interact with information presentation. While information 
about products is widely prevalent in the marketplace, there has been no systematic 
investigation of how consumers react, in terms of product valuation, to positive and 
negative information, the order in which they are provided, and the moderating effect of 
prior knowledge and initial trust of the product on these information effects.  
We conduct intensive analysis of the experiment results. Our results do not 
support the hypothesis that positive information significantly increases the WTP. On the 
other hand, we found that negative information, whether presented alone or with positive 
information, significantly decreases the WTP. However, as expected, WTP of subjects 
given positive information is significantly higher than the WTP of subjects given 
negative information or given mixed information. 
When mixed information is presented, we find that WTP of those given negative-
then-positive information is slightly higher than those given positive-then-negative 
information. This difference is not statistically significant however. This result does not 
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support the hypothesis that the order of information presentation (positive-then-negative 
vs. negative then positive) significantly influences the information effects. Crowley and 
Hoyer (1994) suggest that mixed or two-sided messages represent an important form of 
persuasive communication that has the potential to be effective for a variety of products 
in diverse marketing situations. Our results imply that the order in which the two-sided 
messages are presented may not significantly matter much in terms of their effect on 
product valuation. However, as expected, we find differences in effects of one-sided 
versus two-sided messages, especially between the effect of positive information and 
mixed information. WTP of those provided positive information is higher than WTP of 
those given mixed or two-sided information. Hence, our results do not support the 
finding of some studies which suggest that messages can include some negative 
information about a product and still be more effective than if no negative information 
were presented (e.g., Etgar and Goodwin 1982; Golden and Alpert 1987; Kamins and 
Assael 1987; Pechmann 1992). While these conflicting empirical results may be due to, 
among others, methodological differences between studies, the nature and amount of 
positive or negative information included are likely to be important determinants of two-
sided message effects. Clearly, more research on two-sided or mixed messages is 
warranted as alluded to by Crowley and Hoyer (1994). 
Interestingly, our regression results generally suggest that information effects on 
WTP are not mitigated by prior knowledge and trust. This finding may imply that 
marketers need not worry about consumers’ prior knowledge and trust when predicting 
information effects on product valuation. 
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Our research focuses on the effect of positive, negative, and mixed information 
on product valuation. Given that information can differ on the basis of their source and 
its credibility (Sternthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt 1978; Ahluwalia, Burnkrant and Unnava 
2000), future studies can factor in different sources of positive and negative information 
in the analysis to enrich the generalizability of the study. Our findings are also not 
generalizable to information reflecting a company’s values or reputation. Further 
research could examine the effect of this type of information along with the type of 
information we examined in this study. We do not consider the effect of varying degrees 
of positive and negative information on product valuation. Prior research (Fiske 1980) 
suggests that extreme information is perceived as more diagnostic than moderate 
information and therefore is weighted more in overall evaluations. Future studies could 
assess the effects of varying the extremity of the positive and negative information on 
product valuation. 
We expect that clever elicitation and in-depth investigation of the participants’ 
perception of information credibility and quality might be able to further our 
understanding of the mechanism of information processing. Moreover, by taking into 
account the interaction between prior information and new information, we might be 
able to better understand the process of information updating. These topics are well 
beyond the scope this paper, but may be good topics for future studies. Lastly, the focus 
of our study is on product valuation of a relatively novel product in irradiated fruit. 
Future studies could replicate our study using other products (e.g., other types of novel 
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and/or non-novel products) and other product evaluation mechanisms (e.g., purchase 
intention) to test robustness of our findings. 
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHETICAL NEW PRODUCT MARKETING RESEARCH: 
DOES CHEAP TALK PLAY A ROLE IN CONSUMERS’  
PRODUCT VALUATION? 
 
Introduction 
Traditional new product marketing research often relies on surveys in which 
participants are paid to answer questions about hypothetical purchase decisions.  
Because these studies are conducted in hypothetical situations with no purchase or 
consumption consequences for the participants, they are unable to uncover “true” 
consumer preference structures. Hence, in such hypothetical data collection exercises, 
participants may not experience strong incentives to expend the cognitive efforts needed 
to provide researchers with an accurate answer (Ding, Grewal and Liechty 2005). For 
example, in contingent valuation studies, participants have been found to overstate the 
amount they are willing to pay for an increase in quality of a private good. Evidence of 
this “hypothetical bias” is widespread (Cummings, Harrison and Rutstrom 1995; List 
and Gallet 2001; Loomis et al. 1997; Neill et al. 1994). To counter such problems, some 
research has begun to investigate means of calibrating hypothetical studies to non-
hypothetical results obtained in experimental setting (Blackburn, Harrison, and Rutstrom 
1994; Fox et al. 1998; List, Margolis, and Shogren 1998; List and Shogren 1998).  
Applications to new product marketing research of these ex post correction of 
hypothetical bias are limited, however, because extensive secondary data from actual 
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markets are unavailable when dealing with proposed new product introductions. Actual 
test marketing can be performed but these are expensive and should be conducted after 
some pre-market introduction research such as a consumer acceptance or willingness-to-
pay (WTP) study. In addition, results from previous research imply that calibration 
factors vary on a case-by-case basis and hence, a specific calibration factor must be 
determined for each study (Lusk 2003). 
An alternative method of reducing hypothetical bias is incorporating a “cheap 
talk” script that explains the problem of hypothetical bias to study participants prior to 
administration of a hypothetical question (Cummings and Taylor 1999). The premise 
behind this technique is that one might be able to reduce or eliminate hypothetical bias 
by simply making respondents aware of it regardless of its underlying causes. Cheap talk 
can be regarded as a nonbinding communication between a market researcher and survey 
respondent prior to administration of a hypothetical question. Lusk (2003) argued that 
the use of cheap talk is more general than calibration because it provides an ex ante bias 
correction.   
Cheap talk has its roots in game theory where the interaction of players in the 
game is influential on other players and the game itself. This technique has been 
extended to use in economic studies dealing with contingent valuation but not in new 
product marketing research. For instance, Cummings and Taylor (1999) incorporated 
cheap talk into their study whereby participants were informed of the existence of 
hypothetical bias and its influence in increasing WTP. The aim was to inspire conscious 
awareness of the bias with the expected result being that the participants in their studies 
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would account for this bias and compensate their stated WTP. Different public goods 
were used in their study and three basic treatments were evaluated. The first treatment 
used real valuation whereas the second was hypothetical in nature. The third treatment 
incorporated cheap talk in a hypothetical scenario. Results indicated the existence of a 
hypothetical bias and this was mitigated to near real value numbers when cheap talk was 
included. 
List (2001) utilized cheap talk in an experimental auction for a private good (a 
collectible baseball card). His work was an extension of Cummings and Taylor’s (1999) 
work into a real-world environment. He found that a short cheap talk script was effective 
in eliminating hypothetical bias among subjects that possessed a lesser degree of 
knowledge of the good (nondealers) than among those with more awareness of the 
market for the good (dealers). In this study, List also notes that the dealers’ WTP was 
lower than that of non-dealers. Murphy et al. (2005) performed a meta-analysis of 28 
studies that utilized WTP. Their findings indicate support of the generally held belief 
that hypothetical bias increases WTP values beyond what would likely be paid in non-
hypothetical situations. They found that the magnitude of the bias was the primary factor 
in explaining the bias, and that calibration techniques, including cheap talk, were 
effective in mitigating the bias.   
While many in the field tout the benefits of utilizing cheap talk to address 
hypothetical bias, others urge caution because the evidence on cheap talk’s robustness is 
mixed. Aadland and Caplan (2006) conducted telephone surveys utilizing a generalized 
cheap talk script to see if a more neutral cheap talk was effective in addressing 
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hypothetical bias across different types of goods. Their study design incorporated a 
public good (curbside recycling) with private good attributes (reduced garbage fees, 
convenience, etc.). Their cheap talk design did not reference higher hypothetical 
payment values as in Cummings and Taylor (1999) and List (2001). Their intentions 
were to ensure that they did not introduce an upward bias through wording of this type 
and left their reference to hypothetical bias a factor that leads people to “misstate” their 
WTP. They received mixed results in their study, finding that while hypothetical bias 
appears to exist, cheap talk may either mitigate or exacerbate the bias depending on its 
length, structure, and valence. Other studies have also evaluated the effect of short 
versus long script. Poe et al. (2002) found that a short script did not influence decisions.  
List (2001), as noted above, reported that long script did not reduce hypothetical bias 
with experienced card dealers. Brown, Ajzen, and Hrubes (2003) found that long cheap 
talk script was successful, but only for high payment amounts. 
In addition to the mixed results in the literature, cheap talk studies to date have 
been limited to mostly laboratory setting. Cheap talk will be more valuable to market 
researchers if it can be applied in field market surveys or experiments. In addition, while 
cheap talk has been used in the non-market valuation literature, its application in 
hypothetical new product marketing research is very limited. The goal of this article is to 
explore the effect of cheap talk on consumers’ valuation of a new product using a WTP 
field survey. Employing a payment card elicitation method, we found that WTP 
calculated from hypothetical responses with cheap talk is not statistically different from 
WTP estimated from hypothetical responses without cheap talk. We found some cheap 
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talk effects, however, among those who trust the product in one of the treatments. We 
also found that cheap talk has a mitigating effect on the influence of the treatment and 
control variables on willingness to pay. The next sections discuss the survey design, 
results, and conclusion. 
 
Survey Design 
To test the differences in consumers’ valuation of a new product with or without 
cheap talk, we conducted a consumer survey of grocery shoppers in Texas and elicited 
their WTP for irradiated mangoes. Mangoes are a tropical fruit that are primarily 
imported into the United States because the climate is not generally well suited to 
domestic production. As they are a tropical fruit, prior to entering the country, they must 
be treated for insect pests that if present in the fruit shipment, could be detrimental to 
domestic crops. Food irradiation is a relatively new process from an adoption 
perspective and debate continues on its acceptability as a food process. Irradiated 
mangoes, and for that matter, irradiated fruit in general is not currently available in most 
markets in the U.S. Because of the hypothetical nature of a study of acceptance and 
WTP for irradiated mangoes, we were interested to see how cheap talk would influence 
consumers’ valuation of the product. 
We were also interested in examining the effect of different types of information 
about food irradiation on consumers’ WTP for irradiated mangoes, with or without 
cheap talk. Two types of information were utilized in our study: positive and negative 
information. Information from the Government Accountability Office, a government 
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agency, stating the benefits of food irradiation comprised the positive information.  
Consequential food irradiation information from Public Citizen, a consumer advocacy 
organization, was used for the negative information. Hayes, Fox, and Shogren (2002) 
used similar information in the study of how countering information affects consumer 
choice, and Nayga, Aiew, and Nichols (2005) utilized similar positive information in 
their evaluation of positive information effects on consumer acceptance. We continue 
this type of work by presenting this information in three treatments; positive only, 
negative only, and both positive and negative. Additionally, we divide these treatments 
by using a cheap talk script in approximately one half of each treatment. 
We were interested in the additional amount consumers would be willing to pay 
for irradiated mangoes, thus marginal WTP was the value of interest in our research.  
Marginal WTP was solicited from survey participants in the form of a payment card.  
Values for the payment card were calculated from pre-tests and according to a method 
described by Rowe, Schulze, and Breffle (1996). Respondents were informed of the 
average price of mangoes (50 cent each), which was provided to us by a supermarket 
chain. The payment card values and calculations are available from the authors upon 
request. 
Consumer intercept surveys were conducted in grocery stores in major 
metropolitan areas of Texas in the late winter/early spring of 2006. Shoppers willing to 
participate were provided a brief information sheet about the survey and given a store 
coupon for a free item in the store (provided by the grocery chain). The sheet informed 
consumers of what mangoes are and why they must be treated for insects prior to 
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entering the country. Respondents were informed that food irradiation is a process that 
can be used to neutralize insects in fruit shipments, is an approved alternative to more 
conventional treatment methods, and uses energy versus more conventional insect 
control mechanisms. No additional information regarding food irradiation was provided 
at this point.  In all, 352 surveys were conducted. However, due to incomplete survey 
responses, our study utilizes data from 304 participants. 
Prior to the presentation of information, all participants were asked general 
questions about their shopping habits, knowledge of food irradiation, and attitudes 
toward and perceptions of food irradiation. Pre-information WTP for irradiated mangoes 
was solicited as well. Once this pre-information questioning was accomplished, 
participants were then randomly provided one or both forms of information as 
previously described. After the presentation of information, questioning about 
perceptions and attitudes regarding food irradiation was reaccomplished as was a post-
information WTP using the same payment card values. Our cheap talk script was similar 
to that used by Carlsson, Frykblom, and Lagerkvist (2005). Murphy et al. (2005) 
indicates that hypothetical bias tends to be positive in nature. We chose to maintain 
reference to this positive effect in our description of this bias. We also included 
statements regarding budgetary constraints and asked participants to take this into 
account as well. The cheap talk script was included in the WTP questions (pre- and post-
information) so that those participants randomly provided with this additional 
information received it immediately prior to their WTP response. The cheap talk script 
was as follows: 
  42 
Previous studies indicate that, individuals in general respond to surveys in 
a different way than they act in the real life. It is quite common to find that 
individuals say they are willing to pay higher prices than those that they 
are really willing to pay. We believe that this is due to the difficulty to 
calculate the exact impact of these higher expenses on the household 
economy. It is easy to be generous when in reality one does not need to 
pay more in the shop. I would then like to remind you that it is perfectly 
fine if you are not willing to pay any premium, given that paying extra for 
these irradiated mangoes will leave you with less disposable income for 
other products or savings. 
The average price for mangos in the past year was $0.50 each. 
How much more for each irradiated mango than this would you be willing 
to pay? 
 
Results 
 We begin discussion of our results by a comparison of average WTP by 
treatment and control variables for all participants (Table 3.1), prior to differentiation by 
cheap talk. Pre- and Post-information means are presented and tested by each of these 
treatments and variables. The knowledge variable refers to participants’ prior knowledge 
of food irradiation and is only applicable to pre-information WTP. Treatments 
correspond to each type of information presented during the surveys, and as such, are 
only applicable to post-information WTP. Income, Education, Female, and Trust are 
dichotomous choice variables, and Table 3.1 provides a brief description of these 
variables.  
 We observe that pre- and post-information WTP does not differ significantly 
based on income. We also see that prior knowledge and gender (post-information) does 
not change WTP regardless of the criteria in each variable.   
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 It is interesting to point out that education does impact consumer WTP in that 
those participants with college degrees or higher were found to have lower pre- and post-
information WTP, and the significance of this difference remains fairly constant. 
 Gender was found to be significant in that women were willing to pay 
approximately 77% more for irradiated mangoes than men before information was 
presented.   
 We observe that initial trust is significant in consumers’ WTP. Differences of 
$0.12 and $.08 (pre- and post-information respectively) exist between those with trust in 
food irradiation versus those without it.   
 Our ANOVA indicates that differences in WTP exist among consumers from 
different races, however further analyses need to be performed to better identify 
precisely between which races the differences exist.   
 ANOVA also reveals that differences in post-information WTP exist depending 
on the type of information presented to participants. This test alone only identifies that at 
least one of the means differs, not which one, but observation of the positive information 
WTP mean leads us to believe a difference exists between it and the other treatments. 
 These analyses and presentation of means before and after the presentation of 
information provide general information to assist us in determining further analyses that 
needed to be performed. To examine the effect of cheap talk, additional evaluation is 
presented next to better explain our additional analysis. 
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Table 3.1 
 
Willingness to Pay Means of Treatments and Control Variables1 
Pre-Information Post-Information   
Variable 
  
Criteria 
 
n Mean p value Mean p value 
< $50,000/yr. 156 .1108 .0750 
> $50,000/yr 148 .1002 .0552 Income 
Difference in Means -.0106 
.668 
-.0198 
.371. 
< College Degree 156 .1325 .0898 
> College Degree 148 .0774 .0396 Education 
Difference in Means -.0551 
.025** 
-.0502 
.022** 
Male 82 .0676 .0407 
Female 222 .1197 .0745 Female 
Difference in Means .0521 
.043** 
.0338 
.143   
No  Trust 104 .0244 .0095 
Trust 200 .1479 .0944 Trust 
Difference in Means .1235 
.000** 
.0849 
.000** 
White 164 .0786 .0506 
Hispanic 74 .0904 .0388 Race 
Other Races 66 .1793 
.003** 
.1217 
.013** 
No Knowledge 213 .1159 
Knowledgeable 91 .0816 Knowledge2 
Difference in Means -.0344 
.192 - 
Positive only 100 .1421 
Negative only 100 .0310 Treatments3 
Positive-and-
Negative 104 
- 
.0246 
.000** 
** significant at the .05 level 
1p values are from t-tests of WTP differences by variables with dichotomous choice responses and 
ANOVA tests where more than two criteria exists 
2Applicable only Pre-Information 
3applicable only Post-Information 
 
We estimated the average WTP pre- and post-information presentation across the 
treatments and by presence/absence of cheap talk script. The results are reported in 
Table 3.2. As expected, cheap talk has no effect on pre-information WTP. The post-
information WTPs without cheap talk are higher than mean WTPs with cheap talk when 
  45 
positive information is presented in treatments one and three. This result is consistent 
with our prior expectation as the cheap talk is designed to mitigate the positive 
hypothetical bias associated with positive information. However, tests of differences 
between the means indicate that these differences in WTP means with and without cheap 
talk are not statistically significant. When only negative information is presented, mean 
WTPs without cheap talk are higher than those with cheap talk but again, these 
differences between means are not statistically significant. Overall, our results do not 
lend support to strong cheap talk effects. 
 
Table 3.2 
 
Tests of Willingness to Pay Means between Treatments, by Cheap Talk 
   Pre-Information Post-Information 
Treatment Cheap Talk n Mean p-value Mean p-value 
Yes 51 .1020 .1212 
No 49 .1448 .1638 Positive only 
Difference in Means 
(No – Yes) .0428 
.283 
.0426 
.267 
Yes 45 .1085 .0467 
No 55 .1268 .0182 Negative 
only Difference in Means 
(No – Yes) .0183 
.704 
-.0285 
.458 
Yes 53 .0727 .0233 
No 51 .0805 .0260 Positive-and-
Negative Difference in Means 
(No – Yes) .0079 
.849 
.0028 
.938 
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To complement the analysis above, we regressed the WTP values on the 
variables of cheap talk (dummy variable for presence/absence), treatment dummies 
(treatment 1, positive only as the base), and control variables for income (greater than or 
less than $50,000), education (college degree or less than college degree), gender 
(dummy for male/female), and race (white – base, Hispanic, and all other races). As 
shown in Table 3.3, the cheap talk variable is not statistically significant in both the pre- 
and post-information models. This finding is consistent with the results of statistical tests 
of the WTP means discussed above. As expected, results from the post-information 
regression model suggest that negative information decreases WTP regardless of 
whether it is presented alone or with positive information, as indicated by the negative 
and statistically significant coefficients of the treatment dummies. 
Recall that our initial evaluation of WTP means by treatment and control 
variables identified some differences, and our regression models were evaluated by these 
significant findings to identify those treatments or variables, if any exist, that could be 
influenced by cheap talk. We regressed WTP pre- and post-information on these 
variables that were significantly different (in our first evaluation of means by cheap talk) 
to see if we could identify if under any conditions of these variables, cheap talk played a 
part in consumer WTP. The only variable that demonstrated significance was education 
(less than a college degree), and this was only marginally significant (cheap talk variable 
in the regression models had a p value of only .09). These regressions further verify 
almost without exception that cheap talk did not affect WTP. 
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Table 3.3 
 
Williness to Pay Regression, Pre- and Post-Information 
 
Pre-Information 
WTP  
Post-Information 
WTP 
Variable1 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Cheap Talk  
(1 if included) 
-.0232 
(.0234) 
-.0042 
(.0209) 
Initial Trust  
(1 if trust) 
.1265** 
(.0246) 
.0767** 
(.0220) 
Negative information 
only - 
-.1102** 
(.0256) 
Positive then Negative 
information - 
-.1030** 
(.0255) 
Knowledge  
(1 if knowledgeable) 
-.0004 
(.0271) - 
Participant Age -.0015* (.0009) 
-.0005 
(.0007) 
Participant Gender 
(1 if female) 
.0564** 
(.0270) 
.0304 
(.0239) 
Hispanic Race .0873** (.0298) 
.0565** 
(.0266) 
Other Race .0110 (.0309) 
-.0159 
(.0276) 
Income 
(1 if > $50,000/yr.) 
.0307 
(.0252) 
.0077 
(.0227) 
Education  
(1 if College Degree or 
higher) 
-.0382 
(.0257) 
-.0383* 
(.0225) 
Constant .0412 (.0570) 
.0935* 
(.0535) 
R2 .1483 .1557 
1base variables are Positive Information only and White Race 
**significant at the .05 level 
*significant at the .10 level 
- blanks represent variable(s) not used in the model 
 
  48 
We attempted to segregate the analysis by level of trust of the product.  Trust in 
food irradiation was determined by posing the question, “Would you trust irradiated food 
products?” to participants prior to the presentation of information. The response was a 
dichotomous variable “Yes” or “No”. Our results also generally suggest the non-
existence of cheap talk effects with the exception in the positive information only 
treatment for subjects who indicated that they trust the product. Here, the difference in 
the post-information WTP between cheap talk and no cheap talk is –0.08.  Specifically, 
we found that WTP is 0.14 cents for subjects with trust of the product given the cheap 
talk script and 0.23 cents for subjects with trust of the product given no cheap talk script 
and this difference is statistically significant at the 0.10 level.   
We were interested as well in the effect of cheap talk on the differences in WTP.  
Table 3.4 provides the regression results for the differences in WTP with and without 
cheap talk and also with and without initial trust. Results from these tests show that 
negative information alone or in combination decreases WTP except when the mixed 
information is presented to consumers without initial trust. However, we now see that 
negative information alone results in a greater change than when presented with positive 
information. We point these results out because when comparing the magnitude of the 
coefficients between the no cheap talk and with cheap talk regressions in Table 3.3, we 
note that cheap talk is effective in mitigating the results of the negative information as 
seen in the reduced negative information effect when cheap talk was present. Note as 
well that while most of the control variables were statistically significant in the no cheap 
talk regression model, these significant effects disappear in the cheap talk regression 
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model. We also see that the only significant control variable in the no trust regression 
model was income and this significance disappeared as well in the trust regression 
model.    
 In addition to our regressions of WTP pre- and post-information and WTP 
differences by no cheap talk versus cheap talk and no trust versus trust, we tested the 
coefficients of each of these models for equality. We found no significant difference in 
these model pairs. This demonstrates that the interaction of the variables does not 
influence the outcome, rather it is the information provided that causes the change, or in 
the case of trust, the trust influenced the difference in WTP, not its interaction with the 
other variables. The p values for these coefficients tests were as follows:  WTP pre – 
post (.751), WTP differences by no cheap talk – cheap talk (.134), and these differences 
by no trust – trust (.226). We did observe that in the no trust – trust test of model 
coefficients, evaluated individually, we do observe significant differences in the gender 
and education variables’ interaction with trust. However, these individual results did not 
influence the model comparison overall. 
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Table 3.4 
 
Regression of Willingness to Pay Differences, by Cheap Talk and Initial Trust 
 
No Cheap 
Talk 
Cheap 
Talk No Trust Trust 
Variable1 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Initial Trust 
(1 if trust) 
.0373 
(.0278) 
.0561** 
(.0289) - - 
Cheap Talk 
(1 if Cheap Talk included) - - 
-.0395* 
(.0333) 
-.0082 
(.0232) 
Negative information only .1243** (.0323) 
.0836** 
(.0335) 
.0732** 
(.0422) 
.1183** 
(.0281) 
Positive then Negative 
information 
.0908** 
(.0332) 
.0676** 
(.0321) 
.1070 
(.0401) 
.0661** 
(.0285) 
Participant Age -.0016* (.0001) 
-.0005 
(.0010) 
-.0011 
(.0012) 
-.0008 
(.0008) 
Participant Gender 
(1 if female) 
.0566* 
(.0304) 
-.0119 
(.0313) 
-.0468 
(.0393) 
.0494* 
(.0269) 
Hispanic Race .0653** (.0331) 
-.0237 
(.0356) 
.0065 
(.044) 
.0313 
(.0292) 
Other Race .0773** (.0364) 
-.0142 
(.0352) 
.0047 
(.0420) 
.0423 
(.0317) 
Income 
(1 if > $50,000/yr.) 
.0603** 
(.0285) 
-.0320 
(.0299) 
.0653* 
(.0364) 
.0024 
(.0251) 
Education 
(1 if College Degree or higher) 
.0028 
(.0286) 
-.0038 
(.0290) 
-.0507 
(.0361) 
.0252 
(.0249) 
Constant -.0782 (.0662) 
.0002 
(.0722) 
.0446 
(.0800) 
-.0317 
(.0565) 
R2 .1939 .0893 .1392 .1263 
1base variables are Positive Information only and White Race 
**significant at the .05 
*significant at the .10 level 
- blanks represent variable(s) not used in model 
 
  51 
Conclusion 
Our results clearly indicate that WTP values with and without cheap talk are not 
statistically different, suggesting the absence of cheap talk effects. Because irradiated 
mangoes have yet to be made commercially available, the good was undeliverable and a 
non-hypothetical treatment was not conducted. We would have wanted to conduct a non-
hypothetical treatment with actual product and payment involved. This was not, 
however, possible because we could not find and acquire irradiated mangoes to use for 
the experiment during the conduct of the study. Hence, while certainly possible, our 
finding cannot unequivocally be interpreted as implying that cheap talk cannot reduce 
hypothetical bias. Our results simply imply that cheap talk script does not significantly 
reduce willingness to pay in the majority of our sample. It is possible that hypothetical 
bias did not exist to begin with. We found some cheap talk effects, however, among 
those who trust the product given positive information. We also found that cheap talk 
has a mitigating effect on the influence of the treatment and control variables on product 
valuation.   
The study of cheap talk is still in its infancy and the conditions in which cheap 
talk is effective at reducing hypothetical bias are not fully known (Lusk 2003). While 
cheap talk has been used in the non-market valuation literature, its application in 
hypothetical new product marketing research is very limited. Future marketing research 
studies should test the robustness of our finding for other goods. Future studies should 
also evaluate the effect of using alternative payment vehicles (e.g., conjoint analysis) and 
include a non-hypothetical baseline or treatment if possible.  
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CHAPTER IV 
INFORMATION EFFECTS, TRUST, AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY  
FOR IRRADIATED FOODS: A FIELD EXPERIMENT 
 
Introduction 
In this study, we investigate the controversial topic of food irradiation, although 
the design of our study could be used to address different new products about which 
consumers have little or incomplete information. The U.S. government has allowed the 
use of food irradiation on a number of products for several years (Henkel 1998, USDA 
1999).  Even with this approval, availability of irradiated foods, specifically fruits, 
remains limited. We investigate the effects of information on individuals’ willingness to 
pay (WTP) for irradiated foods. Additionally, we evaluate how trust interacts with 
information in swaying consumer acceptance of irradiated foods. While a number of 
previous studies have focused on consumer acceptance issues related to irradiated foods 
(e.g., Bruhn 1995, Bruhn and Noell, 1987, Fox 2002, Frenzen et al 2001, Lusk, Fox, and 
McIIvain 1999, Nayga, Aiew, and Nichols 2005, Resurreccion et al 1995), our study 
specifically looks at WTP and the interaction with varying forms of information: 
positive, negative, and mixed (positive and negative) as well as trust pre and post-
information presentation.  
Positive information, when presented alone, has been demonstrated to increase 
product acceptance (Hayes, Fox, and Shogren 2002; Nayga, Aiew, and Nichols 2005).  
On the other hand, the literature, especially the impression formation literature, found 
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that negative information effects far outweigh positive information effects (e.g., Klein 
1996; Kroloff 1988; Skowronski and Carlston 1989; Wright 1974). For example, it has 
been shown that negative attributes generally have a stronger influence on consumers’ 
judgments on product quality than positive attributes (Fiske 1980). Similarly, negative 
personality traits have been shown to have a greater influence on interpersonal 
judgments (Skowronski and Carlston 1987) and negative word of mouth has been shown 
to have a stronger impact than positive word of mouth (Herr, Kardes, and Kim 1991).  
Negative information, whether presented alone or in combination with positive 
information has also been shown to decrease product acceptance (Hayes, Fox, and 
Shogren 2002). For example, negative media coverage and activities by activist 
organizations that oppose biotechnology are influential in reducing acceptance of this 
technology (Hoban 1998).   
Trust held by consumers is another theme of a number of studies found in the 
literature. It is well known that people tend to perceive new information as compatible 
with their prior beliefs (Hoch and Ha 1986). The mechanism for these initial beliefs is 
similar to that associated with a confirmatory bias or sticky prior beliefs (Bolton 2003; 
Jonas et al. 2001; Klayman 1995; Schwenk 1986) and Biyalogorsky, Boulding, and 
Staelin (2006) refer to this path as “belief inertia distortion”. When consumers hold 
extreme attitudes about potential hazards, information is not likely to be influential 
(Frewer 2000). Prior beliefs have been found to be reinforced by initial trust or distrust 
(Slovic 1993). However, trust, especially in new technologies, is not earned over night; 
rather it takes time (Sapp 2003). 
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Our study continues work in this area by examining how information and trust 
interact with consumers’ acceptance of and WTP for new products. We use irradiated 
mangoes as a product of interest. Mangoes are a tropical fruit that are primarily imported 
into the U.S. because most of the domestic climate is unsuitable to their growth. Food 
irradiation is the process of exposing food to ionizing radiation for the purposes of food 
safety or control of insect pests. The food irradiation process currently is performed with 
one of two highly technological processes, utilizing either radioactive materials or 
electrically generated high-energy particles. Though this study does not attempt to 
differentiate consumer perceptions based on these technologies, it is at least in part the 
highly technical nature of food irradiation that causes much of the debate over food 
irradiation. Consumer fear of food irradiation may be a result of a lack of understanding 
of the process and concerns that irradiated foods may be perceived as processed versus 
fresh (Henson 1995). From a food safety perspective, consumers perceive food safety as 
a given and not of value (Henson 1995), further leading us to question consumers’ 
willingness to pay for irradiated mangoes.   
Because mangoes are imported from countries that may have insect pest issues 
that would be detrimental to U.S. crops, phytosanitary control measures must be taken to 
prevent the importation of these pests, and food irradiation is an approved process for 
this purpose. Most studies regarding food irradiation deal with food safety aspects of this 
technology. Regardless of the reason for the treatment, food irradiation continues to be a 
controversial topic and though the personal benefit to consumers of food irradiation for 
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food safety purposes may not be evident in phytosanitary control uses, the negatively 
described consequences do not differ regardless of reason for irradiation. 
The public is continually exposed to information about a vast variety of products 
available for purchase. Many of these products are designed for consumption, whether it 
be food or drug. Regardless of the purpose of consumption, varying information 
regarding the benefits or consequences of many products are readily available to 
consumers through manufacturers, retailers, the media, government agencies, consumer 
groups, the internet, etc. In the food market, these differing forms of information, 
beneficial (positive) or consequential (negative), arise from two basic sources not 
directly related to the manufacturer. Government agencies regulate the production of 
food to ensure food safety, protect domestic production, and ensure consumer welfare.  
Consumer activist organizations act as non-governmental watchdogs and investigate and 
report on practices and activities of food producers that affect consumers. While both of 
these groups provide information that is both positive and negative, government 
agencies tend to support positive aspects of foods and the processes and technologies 
used to produce them, while consumer groups identify more negative information, 
especially regarding controversial issues such as genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs), BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy or Mad Cow Disease), and food 
irradiation. 
We utilize information from a government agency as a source of positive 
information and information from a consumer activist organization as a source of 
negative information in our study. We then use a field experiment to test the effect of 
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information on consumers’ acceptance of, and WTP for irradiated foods. Our results 
generally suggest that positive information increases WTP but more so for those without 
initial trust of food irradiation while negative information, whether presented with 
positive information or alone, reduces WTP but only for those with initial trust. Our 
results also suggest that those with initial trust of food irradiation generally have higher 
WTP pre- and post-information than those who do not have initial trust. Positive 
information increases trust while negative information, whether presented with positive 
information or alone, decreases trust. Hence, negative information dominates positive 
information and decreases both trust and WTP. The next sections discuss the study 
design, results, summary discussion, and conclusion. 
 
Study Design 
We use a field experiment (Harrison and List 2004) in our evaluation of 
consumer acceptance of, and WTP for irradiated foods as measured through responses 
received from grocery shoppers in a number of cities in Texas. We intercepted 
consumers in grocery stores and asked that they participate in a consumer study 
regarding a food technology that involved fresh mangoes. Those willing to participate 
were provided an information sheet that described what mangoes are, where they are 
from, and explained the need to treat them for insects prior to entering the country 
(Appendix C). We also salved participants to food irradiation by describing this as an 
approved, alternative process that uses energy as compared to conventional pest control 
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treatments (such as chemical fumigation or hot water baths, though these alternatives 
were not explicitly provided).2 
Three different treatments were utilized during the surveys in which differing 
forms of food irradiation information were provided to consumers (see Figure 4.1).  
Common among all treatments was pre-information questioning regarding shopping and 
purchase habits, trust in food irradiation, and WTP for irradiated mangoes. WTP was 
solicited in the form of a payment card, which will be subsequently described. After the 
initial WTP was recorded, food irradiation information was then provided to survey 
participants. 
Figure 4.1 
 
Experiment Structure 
 
The treatments consisted of three varying types of food irradiation information.  
The first stated the benefits of food irradiation (Appendix A) and we refer to this as 
positive information (POS). The second treatment involved presenting consequential 
                                                 
2 Participants were also offered a coupon (provided by the grocery chain) for a free item in the store. 
Pre-information 
questioning 
Information presentation 
by treatment 
1) Positive only 
2) Negative only
3) Positive and Negative
Post-information 
questioning
Tests of  
willingness  
to pay 
Tests of  
acceptance 
Regression  
analysis 
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information to participants, which we refer to as negative information (NEG) (Appendix 
B). In the third treatment, we presented both forms of information and identify this as 
positive-and-negative information (POSNEG). In all, 352 individuals participated in the 
study. Due to incomplete responses, we dropped 48 observations from our study. An 
additional 2 observations were dropped where trust and WTP inconsistencies were 
observed (trust increased or decreased and WTP changed in the opposite direction). 
 
Data Summary 
Our sample consists of 302 subjects. Among the treatments, 99 subjects 
participated in the positive information treatment (POS), 100 in the negative information 
treatment (NEG), and 103 in the positive-and-negative information treatment 
(POSNEG). Table 4.1 provides a summary of the demographic constitution of subjects.  
We observe that a majority of participants are female, which is consistent with other 
consumer studies of this type (Huffman et al. forthcoming, Hashim, Resurreccion, and 
McWatters 1995, Malone 1990). Additionally, we observe that income is relatively 
equally distributed among our categories and approximately one half of the participants 
have a college degree or higher. A majority of participants resided in cities, which is 
expected as the study was conducted in major metropolitan areas to obtain a wider 
demographic representation.   
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Table 4.1 
 
Survey Participants’ Demographics (n=302) 
Variable Description Mean SD 
Age Participant's age 45.6 14.684 
Gender 1 if female .7285 .4455 
Married 1 if married .6026 .4902 
Race or Ethnic Origin 
White 1 if participant is white .5397 .4992 
Afam 1 if participant is African American .1358 .3431 
Hisp 1 if participant is Hispanic .2450 .4308 
Racoth 1 if participant is from other race/ethnic group .0795 .2709 
Highest Level of Education Attained 
Hsless High school education or less .2550 .4366 
somecol Some college .2583 .4384 
college College degree .3411 .4749 
advanced Advanced degree .1457 .3534 
Employment Status (Full Time or Less than Full Time) 
employ 1 if employed full time .6887 .4638 
Annual Household Income 
Ioto29 income < $30,000 .2483 .4328 
I30to49 $30,000 <= income < $50,000  .2682 .4438 
I50to74 $50,000 <= income < $75,000 .2219 .4162 
I75Plus $75,000 <= income < $100,000 .2616 .4402 
Area of Residence (City or Suburban/Rural) 
Area 1 if participant live in the city .6325 .4829 
 
Payment Card  
A payment card was utilized in the solicitation of WTP. In a payment card, 
subjects are presented with a range of monetary amounts and are asked to identify the 
maximum amount they would be willing to pay. Marginal WTP (i.e. willingness to pay 
extra compared to non-irradiated mango) was utilized instead of a WTP unit price as this 
allows participants to better “picture” the extra expenditure on food if paying more for 
the irradiated product (De Ridder and De Graeve 2005). The average market price for 
mangoes in the previous year was $0.50 each (provided by the grocery chain) and was 
used in the payment card calculation. The categorical values used in the payment card 
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were determined based on pre-tests and were calculated using the method described in 
Rowe, Schulze, and Breffle (1996).   
Based on the pre-tests, we offered choices within the range of 0-50 cents and an 
option of “more than $0.50”. Therefore, subjects with marginal WTP equal to or less 
than zero are reported to have a zero (lowest category) WTP. On the other hand, people 
with WTP greater than 50 cents (highest category) are reported with a non-numerical 
value (“greater than 50 cents”). If we simply use zero and 50 cents as their WTP for 
these lowest and highest categories, our statistical analysis may suffer from 
measurement errors. Consequently, we use an alternative method. Under the assumption 
that the underlying WTP distribution is a sufficiently smooth function, we can estimate 
the entire WTP distribution based on the discrete information obtained from our 
payment card report. Wu and Perloff (forthcoming) propose a density estimator based on 
grouped data using the maximum entropy density method. By matching the population 
and sample moments for each WTP interval, this estimator is able to obtain an accurate 
approximation of the underlying distribution. The density function has a flexible 
functional form 
)exp()(
0∑ =−= Ki ii xxf λ . 
It is known that this maximum entropy density nests many commonly used 
distributions. With K=2, it coincides with the normal distribution. When K=4, this 
density is able to accommodate skew and/or fat-tailed distribution, or even multi-modal 
distribution.  Moreover, the support of the unknown distribution is allowed to be the real 
line. This extra degree of freedom is particularly useful for our purpose, as we are 
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interested in the truncated mean of WTP for people reporting zero or greater than 50 
cents WTP. 
For our estimation, we set K=4, and estimate the underlying WTP distribution 
for each treatment scenario before and after treatment. With the estimated density, we 
evaluate the truncated average WTP for people reporting zero and greater than 50 cents 
WTP. Note that although we allow the support of the density to be the real line, the 
estimates suggest that the underlying distribution is likely to range from [-10, 65] cents. 
 
Results 
In this section, we use the experiment results to test a number of hypotheses of 
interest.  We also use regression analysis to investigate the simultaneous effects of 
various factors.  We then discuss the effect of information presentation and trust on 
consumers’ acceptance and WTP based on the findings of our experiment. 
 
Information and Trust Effects 
We designed experiments to evaluate the differential effects of information 
presentation (POS, NEG, and POSNEG) on WTP. In addition to WTP changes resulting 
from information presentation, we were interested in additional measures of consumer 
acceptance of food irradiation. Therefore, we further investigate how consumer trust and 
WTP change simultaneously with the presentation of information.  
The WTP means by treatment are presented in Table 4.2. In this table, we also 
provide t-tests of equal means before and after the information presentation. Table 4.3 
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provides t-tests of equal means between treatments, pre- and post-information 
presentation. The results suggest that other than a marginal difference between the first 
and third treatments, no significant differences in average WTP exist between treatments 
prior to information presentation. These results are consistent with the randomness of 
treatment assignment among our surveys.   
 
Table 4.2 
 
Willingness to Pay Means and t-Tests  
(Pre-Post Information) by Treatment 
Treatments n 
Pre/Post 
information Mean p-value 
Pre .1236 
Post .1425 Positive Only 99 
Difference 
(Post – Pre) .0189 
.0814* 
Pre .1186 
Post .0310 Negative Only 100 
Difference 
(Post – Pre) -.0876 
.0000** 
Pre .0744 
Post .0229 Positive and Negative 103 
Difference 
(Post – Pre) -.0514 
.0032** 
**significant at the .05 level 
*significant at the .10 level 
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Table 4.3 
 
Tests of Mean Willingness to Pay Differences  
between Treatments (Pre- and Post-Information) 
Pre-information Post-information 
Treatments n Mean p-value Mean p-value 
99 .1236 .1425 
100 .1186 .0310 
Positive only  - Negative 
only 
Difference .0050 
.8715 
.1115 
.0001** 
99 .1236 .1425 
103 .0744 .0229 
Positive only - Positive 
and Negative 
Difference .0493 
.0861* 
.1196 
.0000** 
100 .1186 .0310 
103 .0744 .0229 
Negative only - Positive 
and Negative 
Difference .0442 
.1608 
.0081 
.7531 
** significant at the .05 level 
* significant at the .10 level 
 
We performed a t-test of WTP means for treatment 1 (POS) to evaluate the 
difference in consumer WTP pre- and post-information (Table 4.2). The WTP means, 
pre-information ($.1236) and post-information ($.1425), were found to differ marginally 
(p=.0814). This appears to support our hypothesis that when positive information is 
presented alone, WTP will increase. However, because of the marginal statistical 
significance and our interest in the role of initial trust in food irradiation, we further 
investigate this result. 
We performed a similar test, but this time we separated the responses by initial 
trust. In Table 4.4, we observe that for subjects without trust, the mean WTP before 
information presentation is lower than that of those with initial trust. However, we 
observe that positive information was successful in swaying consumers without initial 
trust to increase their WTP for irradiated food (increase of $.0528, p=.0154).  
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Participants possessing trust were not influenced and their WTP increased insignificantly 
($.004, p=.7355). In a study of acceptance of genetically modified foods, Huffman et al. 
(forthcoming) also found similar results regarding prior beliefs and a lack of increased 
willingness to pay.  
Table 4.4 
 
Tests of Mean Willingness to Pay Differences within Treatments  
by Initial Trust (Post – Pre-Information Presentation) 
No-Trust Trust   
Treatment 
Pre/Post 
Information n Mean p-value n Mean p-value 
Pre -.0112 .1822 
Post 
30 
.0415 
69 
.1864 
Positive 
only 
Difference(Post – Pre) .0528 
.0154** 
.0041 
.7355 
Pre .0551 .1513 
Post 
34 
.0181 
66 
.0377 
Negative 
only 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0370 
.2632 
.1136 
.0000**
Pre .0179 .1088 
Post 
39 
-.0275 
64 
.0536 
Positive 
and 
Negative Difference (Post – Pre) -.0453 
.1179 
.0552 
.0126**
**significant at the .05 level 
*significant at the .10 level 
 
Our hypothesis was that negative information presented alone would result in 
decreased WTP. We found that WTP did decrease from an average of $.1186 to $.0310 
after this information was provided (p=.0000) (see Table 4.2). Thus, the hypothesis was 
supported and we further investigate these results by the trust factor. 
We observe test results by trust/no trust (Table 4.4) and see that those consumers 
lacking initial trust did not change their responses after the negative information was 
presented (p=.2632). Those that held an initial trust in food irradiation reported a higher 
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pre-information WTP than did those without trust. This value significantly decreased for 
those with initial trust from $.1513 to $.0377 (p=.0000).   
When both forms of information were presented (POSNEG), our test results 
indicate a decrease in WTP as hypothesized. WTP decreased by $.0514 (p=.0032) (see 
Table 4.2). Evaluating this treatment by trust shows that consumers with no initial trust 
were not swayed when positive and negative information were presented together 
(p=.1179), indicating that this initial perception was strong enough to maintain low 
WTP. Among consumers with initial trust, we do identify a significant change in WTP.  
Pre-information WTP was $.1088 and decreased significantly to $.0536 (p=.0126) 
(Table 4.4) after the information was provided. Hence, similar results are evident in the 
NEG and POSNEG treatments. This finding is consistent with Hayes et al.’s (2002) 
study of information effects on consumer WTP for irradiated pork where they revealed 
that when positive information is presented with negative information, decreases in 
acceptance with the mixed information is similar to that when negative information is 
presented alone.  
Our results also suggest that initial trust held by consumers does interact with 
WTP. This trust-information interaction differs based on the type of information 
presented. To further investigate the initial trust/treatment interactions, we looked at 
WTP by initial trust both pre- and post- information within treatments. Table 4.5 reports 
test results, by treatment comparing WTP by initial trust pre- and post-information 
presentation.  
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Table 4.5 
 
Tests of Mean Willingness to Pay Differences Pre- and Post Information 
(By Trust – No Trust Initially Held) 
Pre-Information Post-Information 
Treatment Trust n Mean p-value Mean p-value 
No 30 -.0112 .0415 
Yes 69 .1822 .1864 Positive only 
Difference (Yes – No) .1935 
.0000**
.1449 
.0000** 
No 34 .0551 .0181 
Yes 66 .1513 .0377 
Negative 
only 
Difference (Yes – No) .0961 
.0650* 
.0196 
.6471 
No 39 .0179 -.0275 
Yes 64 .1088 .0536 Positive and Negative Difference (Yes – No) .0909 
.0263**
.0811 
.0187** 
**significant at the .05 level 
*significant at the .10 level 
 
Prior to information presentation, we see that regardless of treatment, consumers 
possessing trust in food irradiation had significantly greater WTP than those without this 
initial trust. Similar results are evident in the post-information WTPs with the exception 
of the NEG treatment. In the POS treatment, we see that consumers with initial trust 
maintained a higher WTP than those lacking the trust ($.1864 vs. $.0415). However, 
even with this difference, recall from previous discussion that the change was only 
significant for those lacking an initial trust in this treatment. We see that though mean 
WTP was lower for those without initial trust in this treatment, it did increase as a result 
of the positive information presentation. 
We also note that the negative information presentation was effective in reducing 
WTP especially for those with initial trust. We observe no significant difference, 
however, in post-information WTP between subjects with or without initial trust 
  67 
(p=.6471). Interestingly, we find that when the POSNEG treatment was evaluated post-
information between those with and without initial trust, the WTP of those with an initial 
trust was greater than the WTP of those without this trust. Though these subjects with 
trust did decrease their WTP significantly as previously seen, the degree of that change 
was greater, indicating that the negative information inclusion in this treatment was 
effective in reducing WTP, but prior trust resulted in a higher post-information WTP 
than among those without trust. As trust is inherent to consumers and difficult to 
quantify into monetary values, qualitative evaluation may further enlighten as to how 
information interacts with this variable. Such an evaluation is subsequently made in this 
study. 
 
Acceptance Results 
Table 4.6 provides a summary of the results of the direction of changes in trust 
and WTP (after information presentation) for all treatments combined as well as broken 
down by treatment.3   
In the POS treatments, we see that 22 participants increased their WTP after the 
presentation of information and 18 increased their trust. Comparing this to 6 that 
decreased WTP and only 2 that decreased trust, we see that positive information was 
successful in overwhelmingly increasing trust and WTP as hypothesized. The p-value 
from our F-test is .0055. 
                                                 
3 We note here that this is where we discovered the two participants with conflicting trust and WTP 
changes which were removed for our analyses and are not included in this table. 
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Table 4.6 
 
Trust and Willingness to Pay Changes by Treatment 
ALL DATA Change in WTP  
Change in Trust Decrease No Change Increase Total 
Decrease 29 20 0 49 
No Change 34 173 20 227 
Increase 0 12 14 26 
Total 63 205 34 302 
  
POS Change in WTP  
Change in Trust Decrease NoChange Increase Total 
Decrease 0 2 0 2 
No Change 6 60 13 79 
Increase 0 9 9 18 
Total 6 71 22 99 
  
NEG Change in WTP  
Change in Trust Decrease No Change Increase Total 
Decrease 22 8 0 30 
No Change 15 50 2 67 
Increase 0 2 1 3 
Total 37 60 3 100 
     
POSNEG Change in WTP  
Change in Trust Decrease No Change Increase Total 
Decrease 7 10 0 17 
No Change 13 63 5 81 
Increase 0 1 4 5 
Total 20 74 9 103 
 
Data from the second treatment (NEG) also supports our hypothesis that negative 
information will decrease both trust and WTP. We see that 37 participants decreased 
their WTP and 30 decreased their reported trust after negative information was presented 
(p=.0000). Only 2 indicated an increase in trust and WTP. 
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We see in the POSNEG treatment that trust and WTP decreased similar to that in 
the NEG treatment. Twenty and 17 consumers decreased their WTP and trust, 
respectively, (p=.0000) as compared to increases by 9 subjects for WTP and 5 subjects 
for trust. 
We also performed tests of pre- and post-information trust by treatment and 
change in WTP (see Table 4.7). The results of these tests indicate that although WTP 
may not change, trust does change in accordance with our hypotheses. In the first 
treatment, we observe that when WTP decreases, the sample size is insufficient to make 
an accurate assessment using our test methods. However, we see that when WTP was 
unchanged, trust did increase as result of the positive information (p=.0338). As 
expected, when WTP increased, trust too increased (p=.0010). 
Decreased WTP in the second treatment corresponded to significantly decreased 
trust attributable to the negative information. Mean trust decreased by .5946 (p=.0000).  
When WTP did not change in this treatment, we continue to see a decrease in trust 
(p=.0571). Trust in this treatment did increase for 3 consumers with a corresponding 
increase in WTP. However, we could not make an accurate assessment of the role of 
trust in this case due to small sub-sample size. 
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Table 4.7 
 
Tests of Change in Trust by Treatment and Change in Willingness to Pay 
Treatment 
Change 
in WTP n Initial/Post Trust Mean p-value 
Initial 1.0000 6 
Post 1.0000 Decrease 
Difference (Post – Initial) .0000 
- 
Initial .7042 71 
Post .8028 
No 
Change 
Difference (Post – Initial) .0986 
.0338** 
Initial .5909 22 
Post 1.0000 
Positive only 
Increase 
Difference (Post – Initial) .4091 
.0010** 
Initial .7568 37 
Post .1622 Decrease 
Difference (Post – Initial) -.5946 
.0000** 
Initial .6000 60 
Post .5000 
No 
Change 
Difference (Post – Initial) -.1000 
.0571* 
Initial .6667 3 
Post 1.0000 
Negative only 
Increase 
Difference (Post – Initial) .3333 
.4226 
Initial .6500 20 
Post .3000 Decrease 
Difference (Post – Initial) -.3500 
.0047** 
Initial .6351 74 
Post .5135 
No 
Change 
Difference (Post – Initial) -.1216 
.0058** 
Initial .4444 9 
Post .8889 
Positive and 
Negative  
Increase 
Difference (Post – Initial) .4444 
.0353** 
**significant at the .05 level 
*significant at the .10 level 
 
 
 
  71 
We hypothesized that trust would decrease when both forms of information are 
presented as a result of the inclusion of negative information, which was expected to 
dominate the positive information. Our tests of trust change in this treatment generally 
further support this hypothesis. We see that when WTP decreased or did not change, 
trust decreased (p=.0047 and .0058 respectively). We point out that while the overall 
results support our hypothesis, those consumers in the minority (9 participants) in this 
treatment that did increase their WTP, also increased their trust (p=.0353). This 
observation is consistent with positive only information. However, evidence from a 
majority of responses continues to support our hypothesis that negative information 
dominates the positive and decreases trust and WTP when presented together and 
compared pre- and post-information. 
We have just shown that trust changes as expected depending on the information 
presented. Now we are interested to see if trust is a factor in changing WTP among the 
different treatments (Table 4.8). In the POS treatment, we see that the sub-sample size is 
insufficient to make an accurate evaluation when trust decreases. However, when trust 
does not change or increases, we can make inferences. When trust is unchanged after 
positive information is presented, we observe no change in WTP (p=.7064), and when 
trust increases, WTP does significantly increase (p=.0160).   
Assessment of the NEG treatment reveals that when trust has decreased, WTP 
decreases significantly (p=.0000). Similar change in WTP is observed when trust is 
unchanged as seen in a $.0341 decrease (p=.0249). Once again, the number of 
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consumers responding with increased trust in this treatment was not sufficient to make 
an accurate assessment. 
 
Table 4.8 
 
Tests of Change in Willingness to Pay by Treatment and Change in Trust 
Treatment 
Change 
in Trust n Pre/Post WTP Mean p-value 
Pre .2206 2 
Post .2224 Decrease 
Difference (Post – Pre) .0018 
.5000 
Pre .1506 79 
Post .1546 
No 
Change 
Difference (Post – Pre) .0040 
.7064 
Pre -.0054 18 
Post .0805 
Positive 
Only 
Increase 
Difference (Post – Pre) .0859 
.0160** 
Pre .1672 30 
Post -.0704 Decrease 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.2376 
.0000** 
Pre .0982 67 
Post .0641 
No 
Change 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0341 
.0249** 
Pre .0883 3 
Post .3064 
Negative 
Only 
Increase 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.2181 
.3893 
Pre .0879 17 
Post -.0509 Decrease 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.1389 
.0097** 
Pre .0776 81 
Post .0293 
No 
Change 
Difference (Post – Pre) -.0482 
.0049** 
Pre -.0235 5 Post .1700 
Positive and 
Negative  
Increase 
Difference (Post – Pre) .1935 
.1372 
**significant at the .05 level 
*significant at the .10 level 
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In the POSNEG treatment, we observe similar results when negative information 
is presented. Results indicate significant decreases in WTP when trust decreases or is 
unchanged. A decrease of $.1389 (p=.0097) and of $.04822 (p=.0049) occurred under 
decreased and unchanged trust, respectively. 
We then further examined the change in trust separate from WTP and evaluated 
how information affects this belief. For this, we performed t-tests of the difference in 
reported trust pre- and post-information (see Table 4.9). When presented only positive 
information, mean trust did increase (p=.0002). When only negative information was 
presented, trust decreased significantly by .27 (p=.0000) and similarly when presented 
both positive and negative information (decrease by .1165, p=.0098).  
 
Table 4.9 
 
Tests of Trust Means by Treatment  
(Post Information – Initial Trust) 
Treatment n Initial/Post Trust Mean p-value 
Initial .6970 99 
Post .8586 Positive Only 
Difference (Post – Initial) .1616 
.0002** 
Initial .6600 100 
Post .3900 Negative Only 
Difference (Post – Initial) -.2700 
.0000** 
Initial .6214 103 
Post .5049 
Positive and 
Negative   
Difference (Post – Initial) -.1165 
.0098** 
**significant at the .05 level 
*significant at the .10 level 
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Regression Results 
To complement our analyses above, we performed regression analyses4 using 
data from all three treatments and factors of trust (see Table 4.10). In our pre-
information WTP regression, we utilize initial trust as a variable of interest along with 
demographic control variables. We observe that initial trust significantly contributes to 
WTP prior to information presentation. We also observe that female and Hispanic 
consumers are willing to pay more prior to information presentation while as age 
increases, WTP decreases. 
In the second model (i.e., post-information model), we analyze changes in WTP 
by whether trust is present initially and its corresponding post-information result. Four 
different possibilities exist: with trust present before and after information, with trust 
present before but not after information, with trust absent before but present after 
information, and when trust is absent before and after information presentation. The 
fourth option is used as the base in the regression model. Our results indicate that 
regardless of whether trust is present initially, if it is present post-information 
presentation, WTP after the information is provided is higher than when it is absent.  The 
presence of post-information trust supports our previous hypotheses that WTP will 
increase among consumers with trust in food irradiation. Additionally, we observe that 
the coefficient for those with initial trust is greater than that of those without initial trust, 
further supporting the role of trust in WTP.   
                                                 
4 We performed OLS regression utilizing our imputed upper and lower WTP means. As a measure of 
robustness, Tobit regression was performed on the original, unimputed data (censored at 0 and .5 – lower 
an upper respectively). We found no statistically significant differences in our regression models (OLS 
versus Tobit) and only the OLS is presented in Table 4.10.    
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In our second regression model, we also included variables for treatment. We see 
that the POS treatment is significant and positively influences WTP post-information, 
indicating that as we have previously observed, positive information increases WTP.  
The control variables observed in our first regression continue to be significant, though 
slightly less so, and we also see that consumers with lower education levels (high school 
or less) tended to increase their WTP after information was presented. 
A third factor in our post-information regression model was the interaction of 
initial trust and the presentation of information. Using the interaction of initial trust and 
the positive treatment as a base, we observe significant decreases in WTP when negative 
information (alone or with the positive information) is presented to consumers that 
initially trusted food irradiation.    
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Table 4.10 
 
Willingness to Pay Regression Analyses  
(Pre- And Post-Information) 
Pre-Information Post-Information 
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
trusttrust  
(trust both pre- and post information) - - .2520** .0455 
trustnotrust  
(trust pre- but not post-information) - - .0741 .0543 
notrusttrust  
(trust post- but not pre-information) - - .1674** .0448 
neg (negative information treatment) - - .0742 .0480 
posneg  
(mixed (both) information treatment) - - .0121 .0455 
neg*trust1  
(interaction of neg and initial trust) - - -.1564** .0578 
posneg*trust1  
(interaction of posneg and initial trust) - - -.0980* .0545 
trust1  
(initial trust held by participants) .1205** .0252 - - 
age (participant age) -.0016* .0009 -.0012* .0007 
female (gender) .0529* .0272 .0441* .0228 
area (area of residence (city or 
suburban/rural)) .0349 .0262 .0320 .0218 
afam (African American) .0208 .0366 -.0034 .0303 
hisp (Hispanic) .0787** .0316 .0458* .0262 
racoth (other races) -.0067 .0457 -.0133 .0377 
hsless  
(education – high school or less) .0526 .0340 .0504* .0281 
somecol (education – some college) .0407 .0315 .0007 .0262 
advanced  
(education – advanced degree) -.0034 .0374 -.0040 .0308 
I0to29 (income ($0-$29,999)) -.0480 .0334 -.0577 .0275 
I50to74  
(income ($50,000 - $74,999)) .0378 .0350 .0164 .0289 
I75plus  
(income ($75,000 or greater),) .0076 .0339 .0005 .0671 
employ  
(full time employment= 1) -.0228 .0268 -.0351 .0220 
constant .011 .0694 -.0082 .0283 
R2 .1632 .3102 
**significant at the .05 level 
*significant at the .10 level 
- blanks represent variable(s) not included in the model 
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 Summary and Discussion 
 
Information affects consumers’ WTP for irradiated food. We hypothesized that 
positive information would increase WTP, which held true, ceteris paribus. Nayga et al. 
(2005) found similar results in their study of irradiated ground beef. Similar to Hayes et 
al. (2002), we also found support of our hypotheses that negative information would 
decrease WTP regardless of whether it is presented alone or in combination with positive 
information. 
Trust of food irradiation held by consumers was of interest to be evaluated with 
our information treatments. We found that when there was an initial trust, WTP did not 
change for the POS treatment. The opposite was observed for the NEG and POSNEG 
where a change (decrease) in WTP was observed only when consumers possessed initial 
trust.  In their study of consumer acceptance of GMOs, Huffman et al. (forthcoming) 
also found similar results among consumers with informed prior beliefs. 
These results indicate that when the valence of the initial trust factor matches the 
valence of the information presented (trust = positive, no trust = negative), information 
will not be influential on consumer WTP.  
We observed higher WTP pre-information across all treatments when subjects 
held an initial trust. As expected, post-information WTP was greater when the 
information was positive and differed significantly from those without trust. When 
negative information is presented, we found that the post-information WTP for those 
with an initial trust was not only lower than it was pre-information, but also that it did 
not significantly differ from those consumers that did not have an initial trust.   
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Acceptance of irradiated foods may be represented by changes in WTP, however 
the change in trust alone and interacting with the information sheds more light on this 
subject. We generally see similar results between trust and WTP changes resulting from 
the type of information presented, but this does not necessarily hold true under all 
conditions. 
In testing trust without regard to WTP, our results indicate that change in trust 
follows our hypotheses in that positive information increases trust while negative 
information (alone or in combination with positive) decreases trust. To identify any 
contrary results, we evaluated trust and WTP by treatment and looked at the changes in 
each of these variables while comparing them to the individual changes in the other. We 
found consistencies in change of WTP and trust (increasing or decreasing) in most cases.  
When we looked at the POS treatment and WTP being unchanged, trust increased.  
However, in this treatment when trust was unchanged, WTP was unchanged. In the NEG 
treatment, when WTP was unchanged, trust decreased, and when trust was unchanged, 
WTP decreased. This indicates that the negative information was more influential on 
WTP than on trust. We also observe in the POSNEG treatment that increased WTP 
demonstrated increased trust. However, testing this treatment with increased trust shows 
that WTP was unchanged. This too indicates that a difference may exist in trust and 
WTP as measures of acceptance. We note that no change in WTP may be expected due 
to the positive information (recall that when positive information was presented alone 
and trust was present, WTP did not change), but this comparison was made with a 
relatively small number of participants that increased their WTP in this treatment. 
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Conclusion 
Our study yielded results similar to those found in previous studies of this and 
related topics. However, as we further investigated trust as a measure of acceptance and 
its interaction with WTP and information effects, we were able to identify some 
interesting results. Generally speaking, information has similar effect on trust and WTP.  
However, the trust held by, or instilled in, consumers can affect acceptance of the 
product. Trust and WTP may or may not change as a result of the information presented 
depending a great deal on the initial trust held and type of information presented. We 
recognize that the information effect on WTP may be different from that on trust due to 
the fact the WTP is constrained by consumers’ budget. On the other hand, the trust, as an 
‘unrestricted’ measure of acceptance, is expected to be more prone to change due to 
information input. 
Our findings suggest that decision makers, whether producers, government 
agencies, or consumer groups, cannot rely solely on providing the type of information 
geared toward their intended result. Some part of the population is likely to not be 
influenced by the information in the way, or to the degree desired. The effectiveness of 
information depends on whether positive or negative information is provided. This effect 
also depends the population’s initial perception of the subject of interest. We show that 
the information effect is most significant when the information presented contradicts the 
initial assessment of the subject in question. Not surprisingly, when the information is 
consistent with existing perception, the information effect is shown to be negligible.  
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However this may vary depending on whether it is trust (as a measure of acceptance) or 
WTP that is being evaluated.   
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY 
 
 Information effects on consumer willingness to pay for or accept new or novel 
products continue to be studied. Of interest is how varying forms of information from 
varying sources affects consumers’ attitudes and perceptions of the product. Previous 
studies have found that positive information increases consumer confidence in the 
product as measured by increased WTP or acceptance. Generally, our investigations did 
not unequivocally find the same results. Negative information has generally been found 
to decrease acceptance, and our evaluation does observe similar results, whether this 
information is presented alone or along with positive information.  
This thesis focused on irradiated food, a very controversial subject. Being a 
controversial product, and generically involving food, this study provided a topic that 
allowed us evaluate information effects that are of interest to many consumers. While 
the results are not generalizeable to other new or novel products, they do provide insight 
to how consumers respond to information and how prior beliefs (trust, knowledge) are 
affected by this information and how WTP is affected.  
Recall that in Chapter II, we investigated the effect of information on consumers’ 
WTP for irradiated food.  Interestingly, we found that when positive information was 
presented alone, no increase in WTP was observed as expected, however we did see that 
the WTP under this treatment was higher than for consumers presented either negative or 
mixed (positive and negative) information. Two-sided information (positive and 
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negative) was presented in one treatment, and we evaluated it for an order effect by 
comparing the WTP results of when positive information was presented first versus 
when negative information was first presented. Literature on two sided information has 
identified order effects or increased acceptance when negative information is presented 
with the positive, however we observed no such effect in our assessment. This may be 
due to methodological difference or the degree to which the positive and negative 
information were included in our study. This presents an opportunity to further study 
mixed information effects in consumer perception by utilizing different balances of 
positive and negative information and utilizing information from other sources. Prior 
knowledge and trust were appraised for their ability to mitigate the effects of information 
on WTP change. We found no mitigating effects for these variables, suggesting that they 
are not critical in consumer processing of the information presented. Future study is 
suggested to look into the mechanisms at work behind trust and knowledge to add to the 
understanding of these personal attributes and their role in information processing. 
Cheap talk was the topic of the second paper (Chapter III). Cheap talk is used to 
describe the inclusion of information regarding hypothetical bias in research of this type.  
Hypothetical bias is proposed to exist due to consumer’s possible inability to accurately 
assess their WTP for hypothetical products, such as that used in this thesis. Previous 
studies have resulted in mixed results as to the presence of this bias or the ability of 
cheap talk to mitigate the effects of it. Many previous articles indicate that this bias in 
positive in nature, and results in overestimation by consumers, however we failed to 
identify any significant cheap talk effect. This may be due to a lack of bias in the study, 
  83 
however cheap talk is a relatively new concept in studies of this type and more study is 
merited. More study utilizing non-hypothetical scenarios may yield results that could 
better describe the presence or absence of hypothetical bias. 
Our third paper (Chapter IV) revisits the role of trust and WTP, however with in-
depth assessment being performed. Utilizing the findings and similar methodologies 
from chapters II and III, we found that information does affect consumer WTP as 
expected. Our evaluation of cheap talk showed that this effect was negligible in our 
study and we did not include differentiation by this variable in our third paper. Similarly, 
prior knowledge was not overwhelmingly found to be influential on changing consumer 
WTP and was not included in the third paper. Trust, both pre- and post-information was 
of interest and significant in the first two chapters, and we further evaluate this factor in 
the third paper.   
Positive information was shown to marginally increase WTP; however we 
observed that under conditions of consumer trust, it did not increase. It was only when 
consumers did not initially possess trust in food irradiation was positive information 
effective in increasing WTP. Opposite, yet similar results were found when negative 
information was presented. WTP decreased after negative information was presented 
(alone or with positive) only when there was no initial consumer trust. We observe that 
the when the valence of the trust is opposite that of the information presented, an 
information effect is observed. When the signs are equal, information presentation did 
not have an affect on WTP. 
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In this third paper, we were also interested in acceptance, as measured by trust.  
We found that change in trust generally agreed with change in WTP with information 
presentation; however this was not true in all cases. When WTP was not observed to 
change and positive information was presented alone, we did observe an increase in 
trust. Conversely, when WTP was unchanged by negative information (alone or mixed 
with positive), trust did in fact decrease. This indicates that intrinsic values such as trust 
held by consumers may be influenced by information even when it is not observed in 
WTP. 
Controversial subjects will continue to be present in society. Information in favor 
of the subject as well as opposed to it deserves continued study to add to the 
understanding of how this information works, how consumers’ personal beliefs are 
influenced by the information, and how to best inform the public of new or controversial 
products.   
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APPENDIX A 
Positive Information Presented to Participants 
 
General statement about the benefit of food irradiation excerpted from the United States General 
Accounting Office (GAO)1, Washington, D.C. 
 
Food irradiation is the process of exposing food to controlled levels of ionizing radiation. Ionizing 
radiation is a type of energy similar to radio and television waves, microwaves, and infrared radiation. 
However, the high energy produced by ionizing radiation allows it to penetrate deeply into food, killing 
microorganisms without significantly raising the food’s temperature.  
 
An expert committee convened by the World Health Organization reviewed the findings of over 500 
studies and concluded that food irradiation creates no toxicological, microbiological, or nutritional 
problems. These studies have not borne out concerns about the safety of consuming irradiated foods. For 
example, the studies indicated that chemical compounds in irradiated food are generally the same as those 
in cooked foods, and any differences do not put consumers at risk. 
 
Many federal agencies have regulatory responsibilities related to food irradiation, including FDA, USDA, 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the 
Department of Transportation—with FDA having primary regulatory responsibility for ensuring the safety 
of irradiated foods.  
 
Irradiation can be used as a pest control treatment on quarantined fruits and vegetables to prevent the 
importation of harmful pests—such as the Mediterranean fruit fly. To minimize this risk, USDA’s Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service’s quarantine procedures require the use of fumigation or heat (hot 
water or hot air) or cold treatment of fruit that is not ripe. Irradiation treatment is an effective alternative 
for many types of 
fresh produce because it can be used on riper fruit and on fruit that cannot tolerate heat treatment. 
Moreover, a number of past quarantine treatments have recently been prohibited—an example being 
fumigation with ethylene dibromide. 
 
An important benefit of irradiation is that it can prolong the shelf life of many fruits and vegetables. It 
does this by reducing spoilage bacteria and mold and inhibiting sprouting and maturation. As a result, 
products can 
be harvested when fully ripened and can be transported and displayed for longer periods while maintaining 
desirable sensory qualities longer than non-irradiated products. 
 
According to the Institute of Food Technologists, it is highly doubtful that there would ever be any vitamin 
deficiency resulting from eating irradiated food.  In its 1980 evaluation of food irradiation, the Joint Expert 
Committee convened by FAO, WHO, and IAEA concluded that irradiation caused no special nutritional 
problems in food. 
 
1Under recently passed legislation, the GAO has changed its name from the General Accounting Office to the Government 
Accountability Office. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an agency that works for Congress and the American 
people. Congress asks GAO to study the programs and expenditures of the federal government.  
2Spoilage microorganisms, such as certain bacteria, yeast, and mold, cause strong odors and shorten shelf life but are not generally 
associated with human illness. 
The information presented here was excerpted from an August 2000 GAO report which is publicly 
available through their website.  We make no claim favoring or opposing their claims. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Negative Information Presented to Participants 
General information about consequences of food irradiation excerpted from Public Citizen1, 
Washington, D.C. 
Food irradiation is sometimes incorrectly compared to microwaving.  The energy particles in a gamma ray 
used in food irradiation are up to 10 billion times more energetic than microwaves, making this a vastly 
different technology.  
 
Irradiation can lead to the formation of Unique Radiolytic Products (URPs), mysterious chemical 
compounds that have not been adequately identified or studied for their potential harm to humans.  One 
such type of chemical was recently found to promote the cancer-development process in rats, cause 
genetic damage in rats, and cause genetic and cellular damage in human and rat cells.  This chemical is a 
radiation byproduct of palmitic acid, a type of fat that occurs in virtually every food.  
In legalizing food irradiation, the FDA relied on laboratory research that did not meet modern scientific 
protocols, which federal laws require.  
Very little toxicological testing has been done on irradiated food during the past 20 years.  
It is important to note that irradiation will not reduce the amount of fungicides, pesticides and herbicides 
used during the growing period. The most likely chemical reduction would come from reduced fumigation 
of fruits and vegetables. Yet, fruits and vegetables are very sensitive to irradiation (they break down easily 
following irradiation), so it is not a process likely to be used with these foods extensively.  
Irradiation kills beneficial microorganisms, such as the yeasts and molds that can help keep botulism at 
bay, as well as the microorganisms that create the aromas that tell us when food has gone bad. 
Irradiation can corrupt the flavor, texture and other physical properties of some foods, leading to meat that 
smells like a wet dog, onions that turn brown, and eggs that are runny. 
Irradiation destroys vitamins, nutrients and essential fatty acids, including up to 80 percent of vitamin A in 
eggs and half of the beta carotene in orange juice. In some foods, irradiation can intensify the vitamin and 
nutrient loss caused by cooking, leading to “empty calorie” food.   
1Public Citizen is a national, nonprofit consumer advocacy organization founded in 1971 to represent consumer interests in Congress, 
the executive branch and the courts.   
The information presented here was excerpted from Public Citizen’s publicly available website.  We make 
no claim favoring or opposing their claims. 
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APPENDIX C 
Information form provided to survey participants 
My name is Robert Brummett. I am a graduate student at Texas A&M University. As part of my Masters 
Thesis research, I am conducting surveys regarding consumer purchases of mangos. This study includes 
consumer purchasing habits, the presentation of information regarding processes involving mangos, and 
the perception of issues important to many consumers and industries involved in getting mangos to 
market.  
HEB’s has agreed to allow us to conduct these surveys in their stores. Nothing in the subject matter or 
materials presented in this survey is necessarily representative of HEB’s policies, practices, or views as a 
company. Their association with the survey only extends to their much appreciated willingness to allow 
these surveys to be conducted in their stores and only with customers willing to participate.  
Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary. All responses are anonymous; your identity 
(name, address, etc.) will not be requested or documented. Your participation is very valuable to our study, 
so we request that you answer all questions to the best of your ability, but we will also respect your 
decision if you choose not to respond to any questions that you do not wish to.  
Background information  
Mangos are a tropical fruit that have been available in the United States for several years, but as they are a 
tropical fruit, most are imported from other countries where the climate is more suitable to their growth 
(some are produced in the U.S. – primarily Hawaii).  
One issue associated with importing tropical fruit is preventing non-native insects, that may be in the fruit 
shipments (such as fruit flies), from entering the U.S. These pests could harm crops or plants grown here. 
Typically, mangos are treated in a manner such that they must be picked at a point in their growth where 
they are not fully ripened. This is to allow them to tolerate the treatment processes with little damage and 
to extend the amount of time they can be displayed in the store. Our study looks at an alternative process 
and your perceptions of this process and how it would affect your purchasing habits.  
General Survey Information  
You may or may not already be familiar with mangos. Again, mangos are a tropical fruit that are primarily 
imported. Other tropical fruits that are primarily imported include bananas, kiwi fruit, and papayas. You 
will be asked about your purchasing habits of mangos, but it is ok if you haven’t purchased them in the 
past. The first few questions will deal with you purchase habits of mangos. After those, if you are not 
familiar with mangos, we just ask that you complete the survey while thinking of how you respond to the 
questions if you were purchasing mangos.  
To maintain an unbiased study, I am not allowed to answer questions about the study beyond what is 
presented here. I can answer general questions about completing the survey form, but not about your 
choices or questions regarding the material presented during the survey.  
The survey will take approximately 20 minutes and you will receive a store coupon as our way of saying 
thank you for your participation. Please accept the coupon even if you choose not to complete the survey 
at any point.  
If you have any questions after the survey, please feel free to contact me at the address or phone number at 
the bottom of this page.  
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APPENDIX D 
Example Survey Form (Includes Cheap Talk) 
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IRB Approval 
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VITA 
Name:   Robert George Brummett 
Address:  1007 Summer Court Circle 
   Apt. D 
   College Station, 77840 
 
Education:  M.S., Agricultural Economics, December 2006 
   Texas A&M University – College Station, TX 
   Emphasis:  Consumer Studies 
 
   B.S. Agricultural Economics, August 1993 
   University of Missouri – Columbia, MO 
   Emphasis:  Marketing 
 
Experience:  Graduate Assistant 
Office of Technology Commercialization,  
NASA Mid-Continent Technology Transfer Center 
 Texas A&M University System February 2005 – October 2006 
  
Quality Assurance Manager/Food Safety Auditor 
   Tyson Foods, Inc., Springdale, AR, April 2003 – December 2004 
 
   HACCP Coordinator 
   Tyson Foods, Inc.,  
    Chicago, IL, September 2002 – April 2003 
    Rogers, AR, May 2001 – September 2002 
    Shelbyville, TN, July 1997 – May 2001 
 
   Production/Shipping Supervisor 
   Tyson Foods, Inc. 
    Shelbyville, TN, May 1994 – July 1997 
 
 
 
 
